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Did you know...
... that s.4.28(8) of 
British Columbia’s Motor 
Vehicle Act Regulations only 
allows certain officers to 
“drive an official vehicle 
equipped with blue flashing 
lights and illuminate them 
in the discharge of the 
officer’s duties”. These 
officers include:
  members of municipal 
police forces;
 members of the RCMP;
 members of the military 
police;
 conservation 
officers;
park rangers.
 BY THE BOOK- New  Law
IN SERVICE: 10-8
SLOW DOWN FOR OFFICER 
SAFETY
A new Division 47 in British Columbia’s 
Motor Vehicle Act Regulations has been 
created. This provision requires drivers 
approaching stopped official vehicles with 
flashing lights to slow down and, if safe to do 
so, move over into the adjacent lane in order 
to pass by. 
 
On roads posted at 80 km/h and 
above, drivers must slow to 70 km/
h and on roads posted below 80 
km/h must slow to 40 km/h. 
Official vehicles include police, 
fire, ambulance and tow vehicles, 
as well as vehicles used by 
commercial vehicle safety and 
enforcement personnel, passenger vehicle 
inspectors, conservation officers, park rangers, 
and special provincial constables employed in 
the Ministry of Forests and Range.
The new law came into force on June 1, 2009 
and drivers who fail to obey may be ticketed 
$173 and assessed three (3) penalty points on 
conviction.
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90 x 120 cm
YIELD TO ONCOMING TRAFFIC (Regulatory)
This sign indicates a single lane situation. Yield to all oncoming
traffic, stopping if necessary.
Colour: Black and red on white. Red and white reflectorized.
60 x 75 cm
MAXIMUM SPEED (Regulatory)
This sign indicates the aximum speed permitted, in
kilometres per hour, under ideal conditions.
Colour: Black on hite reflectorized background.
 
60 x 75 cm
MAXIMUM SPEED AHEAD 
This sign gives information of lower maximum speed ahead.
Colour: Black on white reflectorized background.
 
60 x 75 cm
MAXIMUM SPEED UNLESS OTHERWISE POSTED
(Regulatory)
This sign displayed at the boundary of a geographical area
indicates the maximum speed, in kilometres per hour,
permitted in that area unless there is another sign in place
showing another maximum speed.
Colour: Black on white reflectorized background.
 
45 x 90 cm
CREW WORKING MAXIMUM SPEED (Regulatory)
This sign creates a temporary speed zone and indicates the
maximum speed permitted of 30, 40, 50 or 70 kilometres per
hour.
Colour: Top: Black on orange. Bottom: Black on white.
Background reflectorized.
 
SURVEY CREW MAXIMUM SPEED (Regulatory)
See page 3 for complete wording.
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Unless otherwise noted all articles are 
authored by Mike Novakowski, MA. The 
articles contained herein are provided for 
information purposes only and are not to be 
construed as legal or other professional 
advice. The opinions expressed herein are not 
necessarily the opinions of the Justice Institute 
of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to 
this newsletter. If you would like to be added 
to our electronic distribution list e-mail Mike 
Novakowski at mnovakowski@jibc.ca.
POLICE LEADERSHIP 
APRIL 10-13, 2011
Mark your calendars. 
The British Columbia 
Association of Chiefs of 
Police, the Ministry of 
P u b l i c S a f e t y a n d 
Solicitor General, and 
the Justice Institute of 
British Columbia Police 
Academy are hosting  the Police Leadership 2011 
Conference in Vancouver, British Columbia. This 
is Canada’s largest police leadership conference 
and will provide an opportunity for delegates to 
discuss leadership topics presented by world 
renowned speakers.
www.policeleadershipconference.com
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DIVISION 47 - SPEED LIMITS AND 
TRAFFIC RULES IF OFFICIAL VEHICLE 
PARKED ON A HIGHWAY
Definition
47.01 In this Division, "official vehicle" means
(a) a motor vehicle operated by a peace officer, 
constable or member of the police branch of 
Her Majesty's Armed Forces in the discharge of 
his or her duty,
(b) an ambulance as defined in the Emergency and 
Health Services Act,
(c) a motor vehicle operated by fire services 
personnel as defined in the Fire Services Act in 
the discharge of personnel duties,
(d)  a tow car, and
(e) a motor vehicle operated by one of the 
following in the discharge of his or her duty:
(i) a member of the Conservation Officer 
Service as described in section 106 of the 
Environmental Management Act;
(ii) a person authorized to exercise the powers 
and perform the duties of a constable or peace 
officer for purposes set out in the Inspectors' 
Authorization Regulation, B.C. Reg. 372/92;
(iii) a person authorized to exercise the powers 
conferred on, and perform the duties of, peace 
officers for the purposes of enforcing the 
Passenger Transportation Act and the Passenger 
Transportation Regulation;
(iv) a park ranger appointed under section 4 (2) 
of the Park Act;
(v)  a person employed in the Ministry of Forests 
and Range who is appointed as a special 
provincial constable under section 9 of the 
Police Act.
When an Official Vehicle is Stopped
47.02 (1) Subject to subsection (2), if an official 
vehicle with illuminated flashing  red or blue lamps 
or lights, or both, or flashing amber lamps or lights 
is stopped on or on the side of a highway, a person 
driving a motor vehicle on the highway in either 
direction must drive the motor vehicle at the 
following  rate of speed when approaching  or 
passing the official vehicle:
(a) 70 km/h if signs on the highway limit the rate of 
speed to 80 km/h or more;
(b) 40 km/h if signs on the highway limit the rate of 
speed to less than 80 km/h.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a driver who 
approaches or passes an official vehicle from the 
opposite direction on a highway that contains a 
laned roadway or is divided by a median.
(3) In addition to the requirements of subsection 
(1), a driver travelling  in a lane adjacent to the 
stopped official vehicle or in the same lane in 
which the official vehicle is stopped must, if it is 
safe to do so, and unless otherwise directed by a 
peace officer, move his or her motor vehicle into 
another lane of the laned roadway, if any.
SUPPORT THE BADGE:         
RELATIONAL SURVIVAL FOR 
POLICE FAMILIES
See pages 14-15 for other provincial 
laws concerning slowing down for 
stopped emergency vehicles.
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TRAFFIC ACT & COMMON LAW 
DETENTION POWERS NOT 
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE
R. v. Dhuna, 2009 ABCA 103
A police officer assigned to an auto 
theft unit was driving  an unmarked 
police vehicle at about 1:30 a.m. in a 
residential area. He was on the look-
out for a black SUV that had been 
stolen and was reported to be in the area. His 
attention was drawn to another 
vehicle driven by the accused. 
As a marked police vehicle 
drove by, the brake lights of the 
vehicle came on and it made a 
quick left turn onto a side street. 
The vehicle then made a second 
similar evasive manoeuver when 
another marked police vehicle 
drove by. As a result of these 
suspicious driving  manoeuvers, 
the officer ran the licence plate 
and found that the vehicle had 
not been reported stolen. 
However, it appeared that the 
driver was attempting  to avoid 
police contact and the officer suspected the vehicle 
may have been recently stolen, but not yet reported – 
a fairly regular occurrence. 
The officer called for back-up to make a traffic stop, 
but before he could stop the vehicle, it pulled over to 
the curb and the accused exited the vehicle and 
approached the front door of a residence. The officer 
got out of his vehicle, identified himself, and directed 
the accused to stop and to move towards him. The 
accused was seen throw something  away in the snow 
- a clear plastic item which later turned out to be a 
bag  of crack cocaine. The bag  was eventually found 
and the accused was arrested. The officers searched 
the vehicle incidental to the arrest and found more 
drugs and weapons.
In Alberta Provincial Court the trial judge found the 
accused was detained to determine if he was the 
registered owner of the vehicle the officer had seen 
making  suspicious driving  manoeuvers and to allay 
his concern that the vehicle may have been recently 
stolen and not yet reported. The trial judge noted that 
the police have a wide constitutional power to 
randomly stop motorists to check for a driver’s 
licence, registration, insurance, mechanical fitness of 
a vehicle, and the sobriety of the driver. These stops 
are generally prescribed by provincial statute and 
justified under s.1 of the Charter. In Alberta, such 
stops are authorized by ss.166 and 167 of the Traffic 
Safety Act (TSA) and the trial judge found the officer, 
a member of the auto theft unit, had the lawful 
authority to detain the accused, pursuant to these 
sections to determine if he was the 
registered owner of the vehicle. The 
accused’s detention was not arbitrary 
and the officer was in the lawful 
execution of his duty. Accordingly, 
there was no s.9 Charter violation 
and the accused was convicted of 
possessing  drugs for the purpose of 
trafficking and weapons possession. 
The accused appealed to the Alberta 
Court of Appeal arguing  the trial 
judge erred in finding  the detention 
lawful and not a breach of his s. 9 
Charter right not to be arbitrarily 
detained. Although the trial judge 
found that the purpose of the stop 
was to check the vehicle registration, which was 
authorized under the TSA, the accused submitted that 
because there was also another distinct purpose 
outside the TSA - the stolen vehicle investigation - the 
TSA power was unavailable. He also suggested that 
the officer could only rely on his common law power 
of detention—that of reasonable cause—but did not.
The unanimous Alberta Court of Appeal rejected the 
accused’s arguments. Provincial traffic act powers 
and the common law power to detain are not 
mutually exclusive. The Court stated:
Police officers are empowered to stop vehicles at 
random (i.e. arbitrarily), even outside organized 
stop check programs, so long as they do so for 
“legal reasons” related to driving a car, such as 
checking a driver’s licence and insurance, 
sobriety and mechanical fitness of the car. 
Provided the officer is acting  lawfully within the 
scope of the statute, such random stops are 
“In our view, the officer in the 
present case was acting under 
dual authority when he 
detained the [accused] – 
under the TSA to check for 
registration and ownership of 
the vehicle, and under his duty 
to enforce the Criminal Code 
provisions against theft of a 
motor vehicle.”
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justifiable under the Charter. Random stops are 
justifiable under the Charter because of the 
importance of highway safety; the public danger 
of impaired driving and motor vehicle accidents; 
and the relative importance of enforcing motor 
vehicle offences which cannot generally be 
detected by observation of the driving  (such as 
possession of a valid licence and insurance, 
mechanical fitness of the vehicle and the sobriety 
of the driver). It is accepted that the offence of 
impaired driving  involves driving  activity and 
also engages the purpose 
of the TSA to achieve 
safety on the highways.
The mandate of the TSA 
includes administration 
and en forcement o f 
registration. The purpose 
of stopping someone to 
c h e c k r e g i s t r a t i o n 
includes checking  that 
the vehicle is properly in 
the possession of the 
driver. This falls within 
the broader purpose of 
traffic safety, as well as 
within the realm of “legal 
reasons”… [references 
omitted, paras. 16-17]
And further:
We see no reason to draw a bright line here 
between traffic safety concerns and an 
investigation of a possible stolen vehicle. More 
importantly, there is no sound reason to do so 
from a policy perspective. Why should police be 
allowed to arbitrarily stop someone under the 
TSA but not to selectively stop a driver in the 
face of reasonable concern that the driver should 
not be driving  the vehicle for any number of 
possible highway safety reasons - e.g. the vehicle 
is being operated poorly or erratically, the driver 
appears to be impaired, the driver is unlicenced 
to drive, or is not in lawful possession of the 
vehicle? [para. 19]
Here, the officer’s purpose in detaining  the accused 
was to check his registration. The fact that the officer 
also had a related legitimate purpose did not 
invalidate the detention. “In our view, the officer in 
the present case was acting  under dual authority 
when he detained the [accused] – under the TSA to 
check for registration and ownership of the vehicle, 
and under his duty to enforce the Criminal Code 
provisions against theft of a motor vehicle,” said the 
Court. The trial judge made no error in concluding 
that the accused was being  stopped under ss.166 and 
167 of the TSA to check vehicle registration on the 
basis of suspicious and evasive driving  activity 
observed by the police. The detention was lawful and 
not arbitrary.
Additionally, the officer had 
reasonable grounds to detain 
the accused under the common 
law power of investigative 
detention. “Here the officer had 
a reasonable and specific 
concern that the vehicle may 
have been recently stolen,” 
sated the Court. “That, coupled 
with the evasive driving  which 
seemed aimed at avoiding  the 
police and the officer’s general 
mandate as a member of the 
[auto theft unit] to search for 
s tolen vehicles , provided 
sufficient reasonable grounds 
for the detention.” The accused’s 
appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
ACADEMIC EXCERPT:
“Police officers are empowered to stop 
vehicles at random (i.e. arbitrarily), 
even outside organized stop check 
programs, so long as they do so for 
‘legal reasons’ related to driving a car, 
such as checking a driver’s licence and 
insurance, sobriety and mechanical 
fitness of the car. Provided the officer 
is acting lawfully within the scope of the 
statute, such random stops are 
justifiable under the Charter.”
“[O]nce the detainee has had the 
oppor tun i ty to consu l t wi th 
counsel...the police are free to 
question a detained person, even in 
the face of protestations that he or 
she does not want to participate in the interview. 
This means that, while section 10(b) provides 
protection against self-incrimination through 
access to counsel, it does not create a right not to 
be interviewed or interrogated by state officials.” - 
Hon. Justice Gary T. Trotter, “The Limits of Police 
Interrogation:  The Limits of the Charter” in Jamie Cameron & 
James Stribopoulos, eds., The Charter and  Criminal Justice: 
Twenty Five Years Later (Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 
2008) 293.
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VEHICLE STOP NOT 
ARBITRARY DESPITE 
CONCURRENT MOTIVATIONS
 R. v. Kaddoura, 2009 BCCA 113
A police officer arranged, as part of 
an undercover operation, to meet 
with an individual for the purpose of 
purchasing  cocaine in the parking  lot 
of a park. The transaction took place 
with the front passenger of the vehicle. The accused 
was a l l eged ly the d r ive r. 
Following  the purchase, the 
officer watched the car leave and 
a vehicle description and licence 
plate number was subsequently 
transmitted to other police 
officers in the area and a request 
was made to pull the vehicle 
o v e r f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f 
identifying  the occupants.  An 
officer on general patrol spotted 
the vehicle and assumed it was to be stopped in 
relation to a drug  investigation—he was not given 
any other information justifying  a stop of the car. 
However, the officer noticed that the left taillight was 
damaged—the lens was cracked and white light was 
visible when the vehicle braked—a violation of s.
4.17(3)(a) of British Columbia’s Motor Vehicle Act 
Regulations. The vehicle was pulled over because of 
the brake light problem.
After stopping  the car, the officer asked the driver to 
come to the rear of the vehicle, where he pointed out 
the damaged brake light and warned the driver that it 
was unlawful to drive the vehicle in that condition.  
He then asked the driver for the vehicle registration 
and driver’s licence—the officer’s invariable practice 
when he pulled over a motor vehicle.  The driver’s 
name and birth date were recorded. He was not the 
owner of the vehicle and the other two vehicle 
o c c u p a n t s w e r e r e q u e s t e d t o p r o v i d e 
identification. After identifying  the occupants of the 
vehicle, the officer allowed the vehicle to depart; no 
arrests were made and no violation notices were 
issued. But the accused was later charged.
At trial in British Columbia, the officer testified he 
would not have pulled the vehicle over if he had not 
noticed the defect in the brake light. He said he 
didn’t feel comfortable with the request to stop the 
vehicle and had he not seen the defect he would 
have asked for more information about the reason for 
the stop. The trial judge found the officer’s motivation 
for stopping  the car was to identify the occupants, 
even though the officer felt he could stop it for the 
broken tail light. Since the officer’s aim or purpose in 
stopping  the vehicle was to identify its occupants, 
the stop was an arbitrary detention and resulted in a 
s.9 Charter violation. And in 
obtaining  the driver’s licence of the 
accused, the officer obtained 
“conscr ip t ive” ev idence, the 
admission of which would render 
the trial unfair.  The evidence 
identifying  the accused as the driver 
of the vehicle (and as a person 
possibly involved in the earlier drug 
transaction) was obtained as a result 
of the vehicle stop and was 
“The fact that the officer 
had other reasons to want 
to identify the driver does 
not transform a lawful stop 
into an unlawful one.”
s.4.17(3)(a) of British Columbia’s 
Motor Vehicle Act Regulations
“A stop lamp must be ... 
capable of 
displaying 
only red light 
visible from a 
distance of 
100 m to the 
rear of the 
vehicle in 
normal 
sunlight.”
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excluded pursuant to s.
24(2) of the Charter. The 
accused was acquitted 
of unlawfully trafficking 
in cocaine.
The Crown appealed to 
the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing 
the trial judge erred in 
holding  the vehicle stop 
breached s.9 of the 
Charter. The accused, on 
t h e o t h e r h a n d , 
contended that the “dual 
p u r p o s e ” s t o p wa s 
t a i n t e d a n d t h u s 
constituted an arbitrary 
de ten t ion .  In o ther 
words, he suggested that 
the legitimate purpose 
( t ra f f i c s a f e t y ) was 
tainted by the ulterior 
purpose (a criminal drug 
investigation). 
Ju s t i ce Grobe rman , 
a u t h o r i n g  t h e 
unanimous decision, 
agreed with the Crown. 
He found the officer had 
proper grounds for stopping  the vehicle because he 
had observed a Motor Vehicle Act violation. “He was 
fully entitled to stop the vehicle under that statute, 
and to request that the driver produce his licence 
and vehicle registration documents,” said Justice 
Groberman.   “The fact that the officer had other 
reasons to want to identify the driver does not 
transform a lawful stop into an unlawful one.” He 
continued:
The accused’s constitutional right is a right not to 
be arbitrarily detained. A roadside stop of a 
vehicle with a defective taillight is not an 
arbitrary detention.   The accused did not have a 
Charter right not to be identified by the police – 
in requesting  his driver’s licence and recording 
the details of it, the police acted under statutory 
authority and committed no unlawful act. [para. 
13]
In this case there was no improper search nor 
inappropriate questioning  which followed the stop, 
as has been a concern in other cases where evidence 
obtained in motor vehicle stops has been ruled 
inadmissible. Nor was it a case where police were 
relying  on a check-stop program authorizing  arbitrary 
detentions, where there is a prima facie infringement 
of s.9 but justifiable under s. 1.   In those cases, the s.
1 analysis is altered when a random check-stop is 
used to conduct criminal investigations as well as 
motor vehicle checks. The stop becomes more 
invasive and the pressing  and substantial objective of 
promoting traffic safety can be diluted.  
But here, the stop was not arbitrary because a 
violation of the Motor Vehicle Act had been 
observed. It did not constitute a prima facie 
infringement of s.9 and therefore there was no need 
to consider the effect of other police motivations for 
the stop on a s.1 analysis. Whatever other concurrent 
motivations the officer may have had for the motor 
vehicle stop, one such purpose was to deal with a 
Motor Vehicle Act violation. A lawful and reasonable 
basis to stop a motor vehicle is not transformed it 
into an arbitrary detention when a police officer has 
additional reasons to effect it:
In summary, [the officer’s] decision to stop the 
accused’s vehicle was not an arbitrary one; he 
had witnessed a violation of the Motor Vehicle 
Act, and was entitled to stop the vehicle, and 
obtain the driver’s identification. The fact that he 
also wished to know who was driving for the 
purposes of a drug  investigation did not 
transform the lawful detention into an arbitrary 
one.  There is no suggestion that [the officer] 
performed an unlawful search or otherwise 
violated [the accused’s] Charter rights after 
stopping him. [para. 24]
The trial judge erred in finding  that evidence 
identifying  the accused as the driver of the vehicle 
was obtained in violation of his rights under the 
Charter, the Crown’s appeal was allowed, and a new 
trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
“The accused’s 
constitutional right is 
a right not to be 
arbitrarily detained.  
A roadside stop of a 
vehicle with a 
defective taillight is 
not an arbitrary 
detention. The 
accused did not 
have a Charter right 
not to be identified 
by the police – in 
requesting his 
driver’s licence and 
recording the details 
of it, the police 
acted under 
statutory authority 
and committed no 
unlawful act.”
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INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION 
NOT OBJECTIVELY JUSTIFIED: 
CASH & COCAINE EXCLUDED
R. v. N.O., 2009 ABCA 75
Shortly after midnight a police officer 
patrolling  in an unmarked police car 
saw the accused exit his car and enter 
an apartment building  that had two 
glass doors. Another male, who had 
been sitting  on the stairs inside the second door, 
reached his hand through that door to the accused’s 
hand. A brief hand-to-hand exchange occurred. The 
male disappeared into the building  and the accused 
returned to his car. As the accused was closing  his 
car door, the officer approached and ordered him to 
exit. The officer told the accused that he was being 
detained for a drug  investigation, handcuffed him 
and conducted a surface pat-down search. The 
search revealed a hard object in his front pants 
pocket. A subsequent search of the pocket found car 
keys (the hard object), $800 cash, and a sandwich 
bag  containing  14 individually wrapped pieces of 
crack cocaine. A cellular telephone on the driver’s 
seat rang  and the officer answered it. The caller 
wished to buy drugs. The accused was arrested for 
possessing  drugs for the purpose of trafficking  and 
possessing  proceeds of crime, and advised of his 
Charter rights. 
At trial in Alberta Provincial Court the accused 
argued his rights under ss.8 (search or seizure) and 9 
(arbitrary detention) were 
breached and the $800 
cash and crack cocaine 
were inadmissible under s.
24(2).   The officer testified 
he was familiar with the 
area and had received 
complaints from residents 
about drug  transactions 
o c c u r r i n g  i n t h e 
n e i g h b o u r h o o d . H e 
described his experience as 
a drug  undercover officer 
and his familiarity with 
similar hand-to-hand drug 
exchanges. He testified that, with his knowledge of 
the neighbourhood, the time of night, and the reports 
of drug  transactions in lobbies of surrounding 
buildings, he concluded that he had observed was 
very similar to his experience with drug  transactions. 
He said he handcuffed the accused because of safety 
concerns arising  from the time of night, the fact that 
he was working  alone, his knowledge that drug 
trafficking  could be violent and involve weapons, 
and the absence of anyone else in the area.
 
The trial judge ruled there had been no Charter 
infringement. The officer had extensive experience in 
drug-related investigations (undercover and 
otherwise) and residents had complained of similar 
modes of drug  trafficking  in the neighbourhood. The 
judge concluded that the events observed gave the 
officer cause to detain the accused for investigative 
purposes. Furthermore, the officer’s handcuffing  of 
the accused was justified and it was prudent for the 
officer to conduct a pat-down search because even a 
handcuffed person in possession of a weapon could 
pose a danger. The cash, the cellular telephone, and 
the crack cocaine were admitted and the accused 
was convicted of possessing cocaine.
 
The accused appealed to the Alberta Court of Appeal 
arguing  the trial judge misapprehended and 
misapplied the law respecting  arbitrary detentions 
and searches incidental to investigative detentions. 
The Crown conceded that the accused was detained, 
but denied that it was arbitrary or that the search was 
improper.
The unanimous court noted the 
delicate balance to be struck in 
a d e q u a t e l y p r o t e c t i n g  a n 
individuals liberty (the right to 
walk the streets free from state 
interference) while recognizing 
legitimate police functions (the 
necessary role of the police in 
criminal investigation). “Police 
officers ‘must be empowered to 
respond quickly, effectively, and 
flexibly to the diversity of 
encounters experienced daily on 
the front lines of policing,’” said 
the Court. “Police conduct must 
“Police officers ‘must be empowered 
to respond quickly, effectively, and 
flexibly to the diversity of encounters 
experienced daily on the front lines of 
policing.’ Police conduct must be 
reasonably necessary or justified in 
the specific circumstances, in the 
context of the nature of the liberty 
interfered with and the importance of 
the public purpose served.” 
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be reasonably necessary or justified in the specific 
circumstances, in the context of the nature of the 
liberty interfered with and the importance of the 
public purpose served.” 
Reasonable grounds to detain has both objective and 
subjective aspects. In citing  the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s judgment in Mann, 
the Alberta Court of Appeal 
noted “the detention must be 
v i e w e d a s r e a s o n a b l y 
necessary on an objective 
view of the totality of the 
circumstances, informing  the 
officer’s suspicion that there is 
a clear nexus between the 
individual to be detained and 
a recent or on-going  criminal 
offence. Reasonable grounds 
figures at the front-end of such 
an assessment, underlying  the 
officer’s reasonable suspicion 
that the particular individual is implicated in the 
criminal activity under investigation. The overall 
reasonableness of the decision to detain, however, 
must further be assessed against all of the 
circumstances, most notably the extent to which the 
interference with individual liberty is necessary to 
perform the officer’s duty, the liberty interfered with, 
and the nature and extent of that interference.” In 
Mann, the Court also observed that “[t]he presence 
of an individual in a so-called high crime area is 
relevant only so far as it reflects his or her proximity 
to a particular crime. The high crime nature of a 
neighbourhood is not by itself a basis for detaining 
individuals.” 
 
In this case, the Alberta Court of Appeal found the 
trial judge erred in applying  the test for arbitrary 
detention. “While the officer undoubtedly believed 
he had grounds to detain the [accused], in our view 
the circumstances do not satisfy the objective 
requirement of reasonable cause for investigative 
detention,” said the Court. The Court continued:
The trial judge noted that the events transpired 
“in the middle of the night”. It was shortly after 
midnight. Since not all law-abiding  citizens are 
home before midnight, it is difficult to see how 
the time of night could form part of the necessary 
constellation of circumstances objectively 
justifying detention.
 
The officer did not know the individual he 
detained or the building he entered. He was 
aware that apartment blocks “in this area” were 
plagued with drug transactions in 
thei r lobbies , c i t ing ci t izen 
complaints as well as his own 
experience in cases that had led to 
drug  arrests in lobbies “in this 
area”. He relied on the fact that 
there was a hand-to-hand exchange 
between the cross-appellant and 
someone wai t ing  ins ide the 
building, with no conversation 
between them. He did not see what 
w a s e x c h a n g e d . H e h a d 
experienced other hand-to-hand 
exchanges that turned out to be 
drug transactions.
 
The officer’s evidence about the location and 
type of building  where such events occurred was 
too vague to contribute to reasonable grounds to 
detain. He did not specify the size of the “area” 
or the types or numbers of apartment blocks in it. 
With such specificity, there may be other facts 
when a detention could be justified. But on these 
facts, such a general approach gives rise to a 
grave risk of police interference with lawful 
activities. As Iacobucci J. stated in Mann, the 
high crime nature of a neighbourhood, alone, is 
not enough. Even though some apartment 
buildings in a neighbourhood may be known to 
the police as havens of drug  activity, that does 
not mean that anyone who enters any apartment 
building  in an ill-defined area or neighbourhood 
can objectively be suspected of criminal activity.
 
The Crown points to the hand-to-hand exchange 
which, in the officer’s experience, was typical of 
drug transactions. But in many innocent 
circumstances one person may hand a small 
object (such as a key or an earring) to another. 
Without information about the individuals or the 
building, the fact of a hand-to-hand exchange 
shortly after midnight does not elevate the 
circumstances to the objectively reasonable level 
necessary to justify detention. 
 
“ The presence of an individual 
in a so-called high crime area is 
relevant only so far as it 
reflects his or her proximity to 
a particular crime. The high 
crime nature of a 
neighbourhood is not by itself 
a basis for detaining 
individuals.”
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The trial judge appears to have placed some 
weight on the fact that there was no conversation 
as the exchange took place. But a quick innocent 
exchange of, say, a key, might have been 
preceded by an earlier telephone conversation; a 
jilted boyfriend might hand over an apartment 
key or a ring to his former partner without 
conversation. 
 
The trial judge also emphasized that the 
exchange did not take place in a park or other 
public place. She did not explain why an 
exchange in an apartment lobby is more 
suspicious than one in a park or other public 
place. 
 
Added to the dearth of objective factors is the 
fact that, according  to the officer, the [accused] 
was co-operative when asked to step out of his 
car. Since there was virtually no conversation 
between the two leading up to the detention, the 
[accused’s] demeanour could hardly have 
aroused an objective suspicion that he was 
engaged in crime. [paras. 38-44]
 
The accused’s s.9 rights were breached and, since 
the investigative detention was unlawful, the search 
and subsequent arrest that followed were also 
unlawful. But had the Court found the detention 
lawful, it we would not have interfered with the trial 
judge’s conclusions about the handcuffing, pat-down 
search that revealed a hard object, and the 
examination of the hard object. The officer’s safety 
concerns had been accepted by the trial judge, 
which would have provided the necessary 
justification for the pat down and examination of the 
hard object. 
 
As for the exclusion of evidence under s.24(2) of the 
Charter, the evidence was inadmissible. The 
evidence was real evidence (such as the cocaine and 
cash) and would not affect trial fairness—it existed 
independently of the violation. And there was 
nothing  to suggest a lack of good faith on the officer’s 
part—the breaches stemmed from his subjective 
view that he was entitled to detain and his safety 
concerns for the handcuffing  and search were 
accepted. However, “the rapidity with which the 
events unfolded demonstrate that he neglected to 
take advantage of other available investigative 
techniques,” said the Court. “He initiated no 
preliminary conversation with the [accused] to 
inquire about what he was doing. Instead, he 
immediately yelled at him to get out of the car. He 
did not run a check on the vehicle licence plate to 
see if its owner had a criminal record. He did not 
call for back-up. Both the resulting  hand-cuffing  and 
the search of the [accused’s] pants pocket (in which 
there was a strong  privacy interest) were serious 
breaches of his Charter right under section 8.” In 
excluding the evidence the Court further observed:
 
The public has a strong interest in the detection 
of drug traffickers. On the other hand, it also has 
a deep interest in the right of citizens to come 
and go as they please, free from police 
interference. Without the unlawful detention and 
search, the evidence implicating the [accused] 
would not have been discovered. On all the facts 
of this case, it is our view that admission of the 
evidence would bring  the administration of 
justice into disrepute. Therefore, the evidence 
should be excluded. [para. 50]
 
The accused’s appeal was allowed, the cash and 
cocaine was excluded, and an acquittal was entered.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
s.10(b) INVOLVES BOTH 
INFORMATIONAL & 
IMPLEMENTATIONAL DUTIES
R. v. Eashappie, 2009 SKCA 5 
A police officer responded to a 
call of a truck in a ditch with the 
driver’s door wide open, the 
vehicle running, and the accused 
sitting  in the driver’s seat. There 
were also two other males sitting  and wine 
spilled in the truck. The accused’s speech was 
slurred and his eyes were glassy. He was 
arrested for care and control of a motor vehicle 
while impaired by alcohol and placed in the 
back of the police car. He was very upset, rude 
and obnoxious. The officer advised the accused 
of his right to retain and instruct counsel 
without delay and he indicated he did not want 
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to talk to a lawyer. The breath demand was read 
from a card and the accused continued to be 
rude and threatening in his remarks.
After waiting  for a tow truck the officer 
t r a n s p o r t e d t h e a c c u s e d t o t h e p o l i c e 
detachment where his samples could be taken 
by the breathalyzer technician. The arresting 
officer again told the accused about his right to 
counsel and again made the demand for a 
breath sample. The accused indicated he wanted 
to speak to a lawyer. He was placed in the 
phone room and the breathalyzer technician 
placed a call to Legal Aid duty counsel and then 
transferred the call into the phone room. 
Because the accused was very drunk the officer 
had to pick up the phone, advise the lawyer why 
the accused was there, and gave the phone to 
him. After a few minutes the officer saw that the 
receiver had fallen and went into the phone 
room. The accused was asked if he was finished 
speaking  to the lawyer, but he only banged 
around and spoke in his own language. When 
the officer picked up the phone there was 
nobody there so she hung  up. The accused 
subsequently refused to provide a sample and 
was charged accordingly. 
At trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court the 
accused testified he could not remember, among 
other things, being  read the demand nor 
speaking  with a lawyer on the telephone. The 
trial judge concluded that the breath demand 
was lawful (based on reasonable and probable 
grounds) and was made at the scene of the 
incident as well as repeated later at the 
detachment. His right to counsel was given 
immediately at the scene and the accused could 
not be saved by his own intoxication in failing 
to remember all or portions of the arrest, breath 
demand, rights given and contact with a lawyer. 
The trial judge found the police assisted the 
accused in exercising  his right to counsel and 
gave him the opportunity to do so. He was 
convicted of refusal. 
The accused appealed his conviction to the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal contending  the 
trial judge erred by failing  to find there was a 
violation of his s.10(b) Charter right to counsel. 
Just ice Hunter, del ivering  the unanimous 
judgment, disagreed. In deciding  whether the 
accused was given the necessary information 
about his right to counsel and a reasonable 
opportunity to exercise that right, Justice Hunter 
first described the obligations on the police:
[T]here is imposed on the authorities both 
an informational and an implementation 
duty when a person is arrested or 
de ta ined. [T ]he in format iona l du ty 
requires that the detainee be advised of 
his right to retain and instruct counsel 
without delay and of the existence and 
avai labi l i ty o f Legal Aid and duty 
counsel.  ... The implementation duty has 
two aspects. First, when the detainee 
indicates he wishes to exercise his right to 
counsel, then he must be provided with a 
reasonable opportunity to exercise the 
right. Secondly, the state authorities are to 
refrain from eliciting evidence from the 
de ta inee unt i l he has had such a 
r ea sonab le oppor tun i t y ( commonly 
referred to as the Prosper warning). 
[reference , para. 10]
In this case the officer informed the accused 
about his right to counsel twice - first at the 
scene and again at the detachment. And when 
the accused indicated he wanted to exercise his 
r ight to counsel , the pol ice ass is ted by 
telephoning  Legal Aid, spoke to duty counsel, 
made sure counsel was on the line when the call 
was transferred into the room, and stated the 
reason for the arrest before handing  the 
telephone to the accused. Some three to five 
minutes later, when the accused did not appear 
to be talking  on the telephone, the officer asked 
him whether he was finished with the call. 
When there was no affirmative response from 
the accused, the officer checked to see whether 
counsel was still on the line. When there was no 
one at the other end of the connection, she hung 
up the telephone. The accused had failed to 
establish any breach of his s. 10(b) Charter right 
and the appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org.
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RUNNING SUSPECT AT RIGHT 
PLACE, RIGHT TIME: 
DETENTION JUSTIFIED
Ward v. British Columbia, 2009 BCCA 23
Police heightened security in an area 
where Canadian Prime Minister 
Chretien was to participate in a 
ceremony to mark the opening  of a 
gate at the entrance to the Chinatown 
area of Vancouver. At some point they received 
information that someone intended to throw a pie at 
the prime minister, an event that had occurred 
elsewhere a year earlier. This report was taken 
seriously. A description was given over the police 
radio  (white male, 30 to 35 years, 5’ 9”, dark, 
shorter hair, wearing  a white golf shirt or t-shirt with 
some red on it and jeans or 
shorts. Shortly thereafter, 
another radio broadcast 
reported that a male matching 
the description was running 
southbound down a street. The 
plaintiff, a lawyer, was a white 
male, mid 40s, grey or silver, 
collar length hair, wearing 
jeans and a predominately 
grey t-shirt with some red on 
it. An officer saw the plaintiff 
running  down the same street 
and yelled for him to stop. The 
plaintiff was detained by 
police for attempted assault on 
the Prime Minister, back-up 
was called, and he was 
handcuffed. The plaintiff 
began to yell and create a 
disturbance and he was 
subsequently arrested for 
b r e a c h o f t h e p e a c e , 
transported to jail, strip 
searched, and held for more 
than four hours before being 
released. The plaintiff then 
sued police and others for wrongful imprisonment 
and other torts.
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court the judge 
found the breach of the peace arrest was lawful 
based on the plaintiff’s conduct in loudly protesting 
his detention and drawing  attention to himself. The 
officer had articulable cause to detain the plaintiff for 
investigative purposes and had reasonable grounds 
to suspect that the plaintiff was connected to a 
particular crime (an assault or attempted assault of 
the Prime Minister) and believed that his detention 
was necessary based on the police radio broadcasts, 
the fact the plaintiff was running  and appeared to be 
avoiding  the officer, and the plaintiff’s clothing  more 
or less matched the clothing  described in the first 
police radio broadcast. The initial detention was 
therefore not a s.9 breach and handcuffing  him did 
not amount to the tort of assault or battery because 
there were reasonable grounds to believe that the 
plaintiff may attempt to escape or assault the officer. 
The trial judge, however, 
found that police officers 
breached the plaint i f f ’s 
Charter rights by keeping  him 
in the police lockup longer 
than was necessary (wrongful 
impr i sonment ) , and by 
seizing  his car. He was 
awarded $5,000 for the 
detention and $100 for the 
seizure of the car. The judge 
also found that corrections 
o f f i c e r s b r e a c h e d t h e 
plaintiff’s Charter rights by 
conducting  an unreasonable 
strip search of his person and 
a n o t h e r $ 5 , 0 0 0 w a s 
awarded.
The pla in t i f f appealed, 
among  other findings, the 
trial judge’s ruling  in holding 
the arrest lawful. Although he 
agreed that the police could 
stop him or delay him for a 
short time without breaching 
his right under s.9 of the Charter because they had 
reasonable grounds or articulable cause to stop him 
for investigative purposes, he contended that once 
“Dissimilarities between a suspect’s 
physical description and the physical 
appearance of the person being 
detained are not necessarily enough to 
allay reasonable suspicion. The 
investigating officer could not safely 
conclude that the broadcast 
description was completely accurate. 
The dissimilarities between description 
and appearance no doubt would have 
been enough to eliminate most people 
encountered by [the officer] after he 
received the broadcast. But [the 
plaintiff] was not most people. He was 
in the right place at the right time, he 
was running and he appeared to be 
taking avoiding action.”
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the detaining  officer very quickly knew that he did 
not fit the description of the person sought in the 
radio broadcast there was no reason to detain him 
any further. Therefore, he submitted that the grounds 
for detention quickly evaporated and the officer was 
obliged to let him go. And since he was not released 
at this point, he argued that he was protesting  his 
unlawful continuing  detention and his actions could 
not form  the basis for the breach of the peace arrest. 
Thus, in the plaintiff’s opinion the arrest was 
unlawful.
Jutsice Lowe, writing  the unanimous decision on this 
issue for the British Columbia Court of Appeal, 
concluded that the arrest was lawful. In his view, all 
that was known to the officer as well as the plaintiff’s 
conduct must be taken into account. In concluding 
the trial judge did not err in finding  that the plaintiff’s 
continued detention was reasonable and justified, 
Justice Lowe wrote:
[W]hile discussing the grounds for the arrest 
of [the plaintiff], the trial judge observed that 
although [the plaintiff’s] clothing  was fairly 
close to the description of the suspect’s 
clothing, “his height, hair colour and length, 
and age were all different...”. [The plaintiff] 
contends that this finding  should have led the 
judge to conclude that there was no 
reasonable basis for his continued detention 
before he protested in such a manner that 
would otherwise amount to a breach of the 
peace. 
I disagree. The argument ignores the second 
factor taken into account by the judge in 
reaching the above conclusion - [the plaintiff] 
was running and appeared to be avoiding 
interception. (The trial judge noted earlier in 
his reasons that [the officer] yelled at [the 
plaintiff] to stop but [the plaintiff] kept 
running.) ... Dissimilarities between a 
suspect’s physical description and the 
physical appearance of the person being 
detained are not necessarily enough to allay 
reasonable suspicion. The investigating officer 
could not safely conclude that the broadcast 
description was completely accurate. The 
dissimilarities between description and 
appearance no doubt would have been 
enough to eliminate most people encountered 
by [the officer] after he received the 
broadcast. But [the plaintiff] was not most 
people. He was in the right place at the right 
time, he was running  and he appeared to be 
taking avoiding action. [paras. 16-17]
Since the continued detention was unlawful, the 
arrest for breach of the peace was valid. The 
plaintiff’s appeal was dismissed.  
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Editor’s Note: Appeal of this case to the Supreme 
Court of Canada has been granted.
ACADEMIC EXCERPT:
“[The confessions rule] offers 
some protection against two 
dangers: that innocent people 
will be convicted on the 
strength of false confessions, 
and that interrogated suspects will be 
treated unfairly.” - Lisa Dufraimont, “The 
Common Law Confessions Rule in the Charter Era: Current Law and 
Future Directions” in Jamie Cameron & James Stribopoulos, eds., The 
Charter and Criminal Justice: Twenty Five Years Later (Markham: 
LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2008) 249 at 269.
Court Side:
“The poorest man may in his cottage 
bid defiance to all the forces of the 
crown.  It may be frail — its roof may 
shake — the wind may blow through it 
— the storm may enter — the rain 
may enter — but the King of England 
cannot enter! — all his force dares not 
cross the threshold of the ruined 
tenement!” — William Pitt, British 
Parliament, 1763
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Saskatchewan
s.204(1) Traffic Safety Act 
No person 
shall drive a 
vehicle on a 
highway at a 
speed greater than 60 
kilometres per hour when 
pass ing an emergenc y 
vehicle that is stopped on 
t h e h i g hw ay w i t h i t s 
e m e r g e n c y l i g h t s i n 
operation.
(2) Subsection (1) does not 
apply if: (a) the vehicle is 
being driven on a divided 
highway; and (b) the vehicle 
is travelling on the opposite 
r o a d w a y f r o m t h e 
e m e r g e n c y 
vehicle.
OTHER PROVINCIAL EMERGENCY VEHICLE SAFETY STATUTES
Alberta
s.115(2) Traffic Safety Act 
A person shall not do any of 
the following: ... (t) subject to 
subsection (4), drive a vehicle on a highway at a 
speed greater than 60 kilometres per hour, or the 
maximum speed limit established or prescribed 
for that highway ..., whichever is lower, if the 
vehicle (iv) is travelling on the same side of the 
highway as a stopped emergency vehicle ..., and (v) 
is passing the stopped emergency vehicle ... when 
its flashing lamps are operating.
.........
(4) Subsection (2)(t) does not apply if there are 2 
or more traffic lanes for traffic moving in the same 
direction as the vehicle and there is at least one 
traffic lane between the driver’s vehicle and the 
stopped emergency vehicle ... .
Nova Scotia
s.106B(1) Motor Vehicle Act
A person commits an 
offence who exceeds 
the speed limit ... 
in an area in 
proximity to an 
emergency vehicle exhibiting 
a flashing  light by (a) 
between one and fifteen 
k i l ome t r e s pe r hou r, 
inclusive; (b) between 
s i x t e e n a n d t h i r t y 
k i lome t re s pe r hour, 
inclusive; or (c) thirty-one 
kilometres per hour or 
more.
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Prince Edward Island
s.115.1(1) Highway Traffic Act
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POLICE CANNOT RELY ON 
POST ARREST INFORMATION 
TO SUPPORT REASONABLE 
GROUNDS
R. v. Montgomery, 2009 BCCA 41
Police received a report that a past 
member of the Hells Angels, together 
with 15 associates, had entered a 
cabaret. The police made inquiries 
about a vehicle at the cabaret in 
which some of these associates were passengers and 
were advised by an officer from another police 
department that the Delta company owning  the 
vehicle was known to be involved in criminal 
activities, including  the sale of drugs. The next day 
police received a complaint from a citizen that 
considerable traffic was coming  and going  to and 
from a residence, which had recently changed 
hands, and that the traffic included expensive 
vehicles at “weird” times of night. A few days later 
police stopped a vehicle driven by the accused that 
was registered to the Delta company. During  the 
following  week police made two observations 
connecting  the accused to the residence. The vehicle 
driven by the accused was seen at the property and 
the accused was seen attending the property. 
Police then received a 
coup le o f t i p s . An 
anonymous one that a 
new group of people, 
calling  themselves Easy 
Money Production and 
supposedly associated 
with the Hells Angels, 
had come to the area to 
take over the drug  trade. 
A second confidential 
tip reported that the 
group gave out business 
cards in the name of 
Easy Money Production 
with phone numbers to 
call for the purpose of 
arranging  to buy drugs. 
This tip also reported that the group carried 
handguns and had no problem in using  force to have 
local dealers join them and to collect money. The 
source said the group utilized a method by which a 
three-person team, who were not allowed to fight but 
were protected by enforcers with guns, would be 
involved in each drug  sale - one person carried the 
drugs, a second carried the money and a third 
completed the transaction. The source also provided 
the cell phone number and pager number shown on 
the business cards of Easy Money Production.
The lead investigator attended the residence and 
observed, among  other things, a red van parked 
outside. Later in the afternoon the investigator called 
the cell phone number he had been told was on the 
business cards of Easy Money Production and told 
the male who answered the cell phone that he 
wanted to buy a big  one - drug  jargon for a gram of 
cocaine. The male told the officer to meet at a nearby 
McDonald’s restaurant in about seven minutes and 
that he would be driving  a red car or van. When the 
investigator arrived at the McDonald’s restaurant 
several minutes later, he saw a red van enter the 
parking  lot. He recognized the van as the vehicle he 
had seen at the residence earlier in the day and 
observed the occupants of the van turning  their 
heads as if they were looking  for someone. When the 
van left the parking  lot, the investigator decided to 
stop the van and used a loud hailer to tell the 
occupants to stay in the vehicle. 
When backup arr ived 10 
minutes later, the occupants of 
the van were ordered out and 
arrested for possession for the 
purpose of trafficking  and read 
the i r Char ter r igh t s . The 
accused indicated that he 
wanted to contact counsel and 
named a specific lawyer. But he 
was not permitted to contact 
the lawyer at the place of his 
arrest because the police had a 
policy against arrested persons 
using  cell phones at the scene 
of an alleged crime.
Police seized two half-gram 
bags of cocaine from one of the 
“ Section 9 of the Charter provides that a 
person has the right not to be arbitrarily 
detained or imprisoned. The police must 
have articulable cause or a reasonable 
suspicion (as opposed to a hunch) that a 
person is connected to a crime before 
detaining the person for investigative 
purposes. There must be reasonable and 
probable grounds, both subjectively and 
objectively, that a person has committed a 
crime before the police may make a 
warrantless arrest of the person.”
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men, and $2,000 cash and a key to a safe from the 
accused. The accused arrived at the police station 
approximately one hour after the red van was 
stopped. He was read his Charter rights again and 
reiterated his wish to contact a specific lawyer. Three 
hours later, he was given a phone for the purpose of 
receiving  a lawyer’s call but it was not the lawyer he 
had specified. After another 20 minutes, a call was 
placed on the accused’s behalf to the specified 
lawyer and he spoke with that lawyer when the call 
was returned a little over an hour later. 
The police obtained and executed a warrant to 
search the residence later on the same day. Among 
the items seized were cocaine, a handgun, a police 
scanner, and a tenancy agreement for the residence 
showing  the accused as the tenant, but no safe was 
located. The phone at the residence rang  while the 
police were executing  the search warrant and an 
officer answered it. The caller told him that everyone 
had been busted and that two houses had been 
raided by the police. The officer questioned the caller 
about the second house and later, back at the police 
station, the accused admitted he lived at a second 
property. The police then applied for a search 
warrant for the second property and found four 
ounces of cocaine and a safe containing  a 
bulletproof vest and a handgun there. 
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court the trial 
judge held that the accused’s rights had not been 
breached and the evidence was admissible. The 
accused was convicted of possessing  cocaine for the 
purpose of trafficking, careless storage of a firearm, 
and possessing  a loaded restricted firearm without an 
authorization.  
The accused appealed his conviction to the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal arguing, among  other 
grounds, his right under s.9 of the Charter was 
breached because the police did not have reasonable 
grounds for his arrest, that his right under s.10(b) was 
violated when he was not given the right to consult 
counsel without delay following  his arrest, and that 
he was not read his Charter rights again or given the 
opportunity to speak with his lawyer again after there 
was a change in the jeopardy he faced. 
Arrest
As for the reasonable grounds issue, Justice Tysoe, 
authoring  the unanimous opinion, first noted the law 
and its connection to arrest:
Section 9 of the Charter provides that a 
person has the right not to be arbitrarily 
detained or imprisoned. The police must 
have articulable cause or a reasonable 
suspicion (as opposed to a hunch) that a 
person is connected to a crime before 
detaining  the person for investigative 
purposes. There must be reasonable and 
probable grounds, both subjectively and 
objectively, that a person has committed a 
crime before the police may make a 
warrantless arrest of the person. [references 
omitted, para. 24]
Here, “the police did not detain the [accused] for 
investigative purposes; they initially detained him for 
the purpose of arresting  him and they continued his 
detention following  his arrest,” said Justice Tysoe. 
“The issue is whether there were reasonable and 
probable grounds for the arrest of the [accused] and, 
if not, whether the detention was arbitrary.”
The investigator said he believed that he had grounds 
to arrest the occupants of the red van for possessing  a 
controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking. 
And the trial judge concluded the officer objectively 
had reasonable grounds to arrest the accused 
because of the following:
1. an organization associated with the Hell's Angels 
was openly endeavouring to take over the drug 
trade in the area. 
2. in doing  so, they possessed handguns and were 
prepared to resort to violence. 
3. they operated as a team with different duties 
relegated to different persons. One carried the 
drugs and one carried the money. A third was 
responsible for enforcement duties. 
4. at an earlier time the accused was found driving 
a vehicle owned by a company associated with 
criminal activity. 
5. members of the organization passed out business 
cards in the name of “Easy Money Productions” 
containing a phone number. 
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6. some members of the organization resided at the 
first targeted residence, a residence which 
contained illicit drugs and weapons. Activity 
consistent with drug trafficking was observed. 
7. a red van was seen parked at that residence 
shortly before the investigator made his Dial-A-
Dope call. 
8. that call was made to a number which the 
investigator had reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe was the number on the 
business card handed out by this organization. 
9. minutes after the drug  buy was arranged for the 
McDonald's restaurant, the same red van that 
had been seen at the residence arrived at the 
agreed upon location.
10. consistent with the practice of those selling drugs 
in this manner, the van moved quickly through 
the parking  lot without stopping. The occupants 
of the van were craning heads as they passed 
through the parking lot, consistent with such a 
practice in an effort to locate their client while 
avoiding drug rip-offs or police. 
11. the presence of four individuals in the vehicle 
that departed the residence minutes earlier was 
consistent with information that the organization 
delegated different duties to a number of people 
in a drug transaction.
12. consistent with that practice 
the accused was found with 
ove r $2 ,000 in t h ree 
bundles in his possession 
on his arrest and another 
passenger was found with 
cocaine in an amount 
consistent with that ordered 
by the investigator.
The Appeal Court ruled the trial 
judge improperly relied on 
evidence discovered after the 
accused’s arrest (see underlining 
above) in concluding  that 
objective grounds existed. He 
should not have relied on the 
discovery of drugs and weapons 
in the residence after it was 
searched or the drugs and cash 
t h a t w e r e f o u n d o n t h e 
occupants of the van after they 
were arrested. However, even without this 
information the remaining  factors known to the 
officer objectively provided reasonable grounds that 
the accused was participating  in the offence of 
trafficking in cocaine. 
This was not a case where the police had not 
observed or initiated a drug  transaction and were 
relying  on nothing  more than the information 
provided by the informant. Rather,  in addition to the 
information provided by tips and observations made 
by the police, the investigator had initiated a drug 
transaction by pretending  to arrange for the purchase 
of cocaine, and the vehicle in which the accused 
was a passenger arrived at the place and within the 
time frame arranged for the consummation of the 
transaction. And even though the accused was a 
stranger to the investigator, there were reasonable 
grounds to believe he was participating  in a joint 
enterprise involving  the sale of cocaine. “While there 
was a possibility that the [accused] had been a 
hitchhiker, it was rather remote in view of the fact 
that he was sitting  in the front passenger’s seat of a 
vehicle containing  two other passengers in the back 
seat,” said Justice Tysoe. Since there were reasonable 
grounds, both subjectively and objectively, for the 
accused’s arrest, his right 
under s.9 of the Charter 
was not violated.
Right to Counsel
The accused contended 
the police violated his s.
1 0 ( b ) C h a r t e r r i g h t 
because they failed to 
allow him to call from a 
cell phone at the scene of 
his arrest and that there 
was an unacceptable 
delay of three hours and 
twenty minutes between 
the time he was brought to 
the police station and the 
time a call was placed to 
t h e l a w y e r h e h a d 
specified. In rejecting  this 
ground of appeal Justice 
“Section 10(b) of the Charter provides 
that an arrested or detained person 
has the right to retain and instruct 
counsel without delay and to be 
informed of that right. ... If an arrested 
person indicates that he or she wishes 
to exercise the right to counsel, the 
police have the duties, except in urgent 
or dangerous circumstances, to 
provide the person with a reasonable 
opportunity to exercise the right, and 
to refrain from eliciting evidence from 
the person until he or she has had a 
reasonable opportunity to retain and 
instruct counsel.”
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Tysoe described the right 
to counsel under s.10(b) 
as follows:
Section 10(b) of the 
Charter provides that 
a n a r r e s t e d o r 
detained person has 
the right to retain and 
i n s t r u c t c o u n s e l 
without delay and to 
be informed of that 
right. ...
If an arrested person 
indicates that he or she wishes to exercise the 
right to counsel, the police have the duties, 
except in urgent or dangerous circumstances, 
to provide the person with a reasonable 
opportunity to exercise the right, and to 
refrain from eliciting  evidence from the 
person until he or she has had a reasonable 
opportunity to retain and instruct counsel. 
[references omitted, paras. 32-33]
In agreeing  with the trial judge that it was neither 
reasonable nor practical to allow the accused to use 
a cell phone at the scene of his arrest, Justice Tysoe 
stated:
The police considered the arrest to be one of 
high risk. The [accused] was believed to be 
associated with an organization that used 
violence. It would have been difficult for the 
police to ensure that the call was not used for 
an improper purpose and to provide the 
[accused] with privacy at the scene of his 
arrest while ensuring that he was secure.
The police station had only one private phone 
for conversations with lawyers, and the police 
had to deal with the three other men arrested 
with the [accused], as well as an unrelated 
matter. The trial judge made the finding of fact 
that the [accused] was provided access to 
counsel as soon as was reasonably possible in 
all of the circumstances. I am not persuaded 
that the judge made a palpable error in 
making this finding. [paras. 35-36]
Justice Tysoe also noted the police neither attempted 
to elicit evidence from the accused nor received any 
information from him before 
he spoke with his lawyer.
A s f o r t h e a c c u s e d ’s 
contention that he should 
have been re-advised of his 
Charter rights when the 
investigation changed from 
one involving  a “dial-a-dope” 
operation to one involving  a 
“stash” or “stockpile” of 
cocaine, it was rejected. 
“There was not a change in 
jeopardy that resulted in a 
violation of s. 10(b),” said Justice Tysoe. “The 
purpose of the search warrant was to search the 
[second] residence for cocaine and implements 
related to the intended charge of trafficking  in 
cocaine. There was no change in the intended charge 
prior to the execution of the search warrant. 
Although the police expected to find a greater 
amount of cocaine at the [second] residence than 
had been seized from one of the occupants of the 
red van at the time of the arrest, the accused was not 
exposed to a materially different sentence as a result 
of the additional cocaine being  located.” The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Court Side:
“Expecting police officers to ask 
‘clarifying questions,’ when it is 
unclear whether a suspect is 
competent to waive the right to 
counsel, should become a routine 
aspect of sound police practice in 
Canada.” A Review  of Brydges Duty Counsel 
Services  in Canada, s. 8.7 Education & Training, 
Department of Justice Canada.
“The police considered the arrest to be 
one of high risk. The [accused] was 
believed to be associated with an 
organization that used violence. It would 
have been difficult for the police to ensure 
that the call was not used for an improper 
purpose and to provide the [accused] 
with privacy at the scene of his arrest 
while ensuring that he was secure.”
20
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UNDERTAKING CONDITIONS 
EFFECTIVE DESPITE PTA 
INVALIDATION
R. v. Oliveira, 2009 ONCA 219 
The accused was arrested for 
assaulting  a police officer and failing 
to provide a roadside breath sample. 
He was released on a promise to 
appear requiring  him to attend court 
at a later date and he also entered into an 
undertaking  which included a condition that he 
abstain from consuming  alcohol. About a month 
later, just three days before the accused’s first court 
appearance, the information alleging  the offences 
was sworn and the promise to appear was confirmed. 
About two weeks later a police officer stopped the 
accused as he was walking  down the street and, 
believing  he had been drinking, arrested him for 
breaching  the no consume condition of his 
undertaking. The next day he again appeared in court 
on the assault and refusal charges. 
At his breach of undertaking  trial in the Ontario 
Court of Justice the trial judge accepted that the 
information containing  the initial charges of assault 
and refusing  to provide a breath sample had not 
been laid “as soon as practicable” as required by s.
505 of the Criminal Code, rendering  the promise to 
appear of no force and effect. The Crown submitted, 
however, that the undertaking  remained valid as long 
as the charges on which the accused had been 
released were before the court. The trial judge 
concluded the promise to appear and the 
undertaking  were in essence a single release 
document - one setting  out the attendance 
requirements and the other setting  out the conditions 
or restrictions - and that the undertaking  existed only 
as long  as the promise to appear remained valid. 
Since the promise to appear was rendered a nullity 
the undertaking  related to that promise to appear was 
also a nullity. The accused was acquitted on the 
breach charge. A Crown appeal to the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice was dismissed.
The Crown then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing  the lower courts improperly 
concluded that the promise to appear and the 
undertaking  were so closely tied that an action 
rendering  the promise to appear a nullity must render 
the undertaking  a nullity. Justice Doherty, authoring 
the unanimous appeal court decision described the 
current process for police release as follows:
Part XVI of the Criminal Code sets out a 
detailed procedural scheme governing  the 
laying  of criminal charges and the arrest, 
detention and release of persons charged 
with criminal offences. Among  other 
purposes, Part XVI seeks to minimize, to the 
extent consistent with the public interest, the 
pre-trial incarceration of persons charged 
with criminal offences. To achieve that goal, 
several provisions of Part XVI permit a peace 
officer to release an individual, thereby 
avoiding  the need to hold that person in 
custody pending appearance before a 
judicial officer: see Criminal Code, ss. 496, 
498, 499, 503(2). 
A peace officer who arrests an accused may 
release that person on a promise to appear. 
That document compels the named person to 
appear in court on a specified date in answer 
to the charge set out in the promise to 
appear: Criminal Code, s. 501. Failure to 
appear as required is a criminal offence: 
Criminal Code, s. 145(5). 
If an accused is released on a promise to 
appear, two steps are necessary to bring the 
criminal charges before the court. First, an 
information alleging the offence(s) must be 
laid before a justice “as soon as practicable” 
and “in any event before the time stated in 
the ... promise to appear”: Criminal Code, s. 
505. Failure to lay the information “as soon 
as practicable” renders the promise to appear 
ineffective and provides a defence to a 
charge of failure to appear as directed by the 
promise to appear. 
The second step necessary to move the 
criminal charges forward also takes place 
when the information is laid before the 
justice of the peace. The justice of the peace 
must decide whether to confirm or cancel 
the promise to appear. If he or she cancels 
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the promise to appear, it is of no force and 
effect, the accused is not required to appear 
at the time and place set out in the promise 
to appear, and failure to appear is not a 
criminal offence. A justice of the peace may 
cancel a promise to appear for various 
reasons. For example, the justice of the 
peace may conclude that the criminal 
charge(s) should not have been brought 
against the accused, or that some other 
process should be used to compel the 
attendance of the accused: Criminal Code, s. 
508.
 
Although the promise to appear and other 
similar mechanisms for release by the police 
introduced into the Criminal Code by the Bail 
Reform Act  ... gave the police broad powers 
of release, those powers were deficient in 
that they did not permit the police to impose 
conditions as a term of the release. Unless 
the police were satisfied that the arrested 
person should be released without any 
conditions, they had to detain that person 
pending appearance before a justice of the 
peace. The justice of the peace could then 
release that individual on the appropriate 
bail conditions. This shortcoming was 
eventually cured by amendments that gave a 
peace officer who released the person on a 
promise to appear, the power to require that 
person to enter into an undertaking before 
being released: Criminal Code, s. 503(2). 
That undertaking could contain one or more 
of the conditions set out in s. 503(2.1) of the 
Criminal Code and is aptly described as 
“police bail”. [references omitted, paras. 2-6]
When an accused is charged with the crime of 
breaching  an undertaking, the Crown must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the undertaking  was 
in force on the date of the alleged breach - an 
essential component of the actus reus. So the issue of 
whether the undertaking  was in force on the date of 
the alleged breach was critical. Justice Doherty 
described the connection between the PTA and the 
undertaking as follows:
 The promise to appear and the undertaking 
given to a peace officer are closely related 
documents. Taken together, they are an 
integral part of the “police bail” provisions in 
Part XVI of the Criminal Code. I cannot, 
however, agree with the trial judge that the 
two documents are “in essence a single 
release document”. The documents serve two 
very different purposes. 
 The purpose of the promise to appear is to 
secure the initial attendance of the accused 
in court. Subsequent court attendances are 
pursuant to court orders. A defect in the 
promise to appear, or the process required to 
confirm a promise to appear, will not affect 
the validity of the information charging  the 
offences referred to in the promise to appear. 
Nor will those defects affect the Crown’s 
ability to proceed on the charges referred to 
in the promise to appear, or the ultimate 
disposition of those charges: see Criminal 
Code, ss. 485(2), (3). In short, after the first 
appearance of an accused, the promise to 
appear is largely irrelevant to the criminal 
process.
 The undertaking serves a very different 
purpose. It constitutes a promise by the 
accused to comply with certain conditions in 
exchange for his release from custody 
pending the resolution of the charges. The 
conditions in the undertaking are put in 
place to protect the public by providing 
some measure of control over an accused’s 
conduct while the criminal proceedings are 
extant . Subject to var ia t ion of the 
undertaking through the review procedures 
set out in the Criminal Code (see ss. 503(2.2), 
(2.3)), the terms of the undertaking, like the 
terms of most forms of judicial bail, remain 
in full force and effect until the accused is 
tried and, if convicted, sentenced: Criminal 
Code, s. 523(1)(b).
 
The purpose of an undertaking, and the 
rationale underlying the peace officer’s 
power to release on an undertaking, link that 
document, not to the initial attendance in 
court of the accused, but to the criminal 
charges on which the accused was released 
as those charges progress to disposition. 
Viewed purposively, the l i fe of the 
undertaking should be tied to the life of the 
charges giving  rise to the undertaking. The 
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language of s. 523(1)(b) makes that link. 
[paras. 29-32]
Here, the charges on which the accused was 
released on his undertaking  were before the court on 
the date of the alleged breach of his undertaking. The 
court had both jurisdiction over the accused as well 
as the offences for which he had been released on 
his undertaking. The allegations were making  their 
way through court and the justification for the 
undertaking  - to secure the accused’s good behaviour 
pending  the outcome of the charges against him - 
remained as valid the day he was allegedly in breach 
as the day he was released. And the Appeal Court 
also rejected the accused’s submission that if the 
undertaking  survived after the promise to appear was 
rendered invalid an accused could remain subject to 
an undertaking  issued by a peace officer for an 
indefinite period of time when there were no longer 
any charges against that accused. “The undertaking 
cannot survive if the charges giving  rise to the 
undertaking  are no longer before the court,” said 
Justice Doherty. He continued:
Not only does a purposive examination of 
the promise to appear and the undertaking 
tell me that the two documents should not 
share a common lifespan, the relevant 
provisions of the Criminal Code support the 
same conclusion. The promise to appear is 
ineffective unless an information is laid in 
compliance with s. 505 and the promise to 
appear is confirmed by a justice of the peace 
pursuant to s. 508. These requirements reflect 
the policy that no person should be 
compelled to attend court in answer to a 
criminal charge unless the judicial officer has 
reviewed that charge and determined that the 
accused should be required to come to court. 
The legal enforceability of the promise to 
appear depends on placing an information 
before a justice of the peace in compliance 
with s. 505 and the confirmation of the 
appearance notice in compliance with s. 
508. The accused’s legal obligation to attend 
court in compliance with the promise to 
appear, therefore, does not crystallize until 
some time between the date on which the 
accused is released on the promise to appear, 
and the date on which he is actually required 
to appear. 
The language of s. 145(5) makes the delayed 
enforceability of the promise to appear clear. 
The offence created by that section provides 
that the promise to appear must have been 
“confirmed by a justice under section 508” 
before failure to appear as required by that 
document will constitute an offence. 
In contrast to the delayed enforceability of 
the promise to appear, an undertaking  issued 
by a peace officer is effective immediately. 
The undertaking is in full force and effect 
even before the information relating  to the 
charges in the undertaking  is laid pursuant to 
s. 505 and the appearance notice is 
confirmed pursuant to s. 508. Non-
compliance with an undertaking at any time 
after it is issued is a criminal offence.
 The immediate enforceability of the 
undertaking is clear from the language of s. 
145(5.1), the section which creates the 
offence of non-compliance with an 
undertaking issued by a police officer. ... 
 Not only do the Criminal Code provisions 
provide that the undertaking is effective and 
binding  on an accused before a promise to 
appear is validated, but nothing in the 
relevant provisions of the Criminal Code ties 
the enforceability of the undertaking to the 
validity of the promise to appear. To the 
contrary, s. 523(1) expressly ties the ongoing 
enforceability of the undertaking to the 
continued prosecution of the offence, or a 
related offence, on which the accused was 
released on the undertaking. [references 
omitted, paras. 35-39]
The invalidity of the promise to appear caused by the 
failure to lay the information “as soon as practicable” 
did not render the undertaking  void or otherwise 
ineffective and its life was tied to the existence of the 
ongoing  criminal proceedings in respect of the 
charges that gave rise to the undertaking. The 
Crown’s appeal was allowed, the accused’s acquittals 
were set aside, and convictions were substituted. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
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BORDER ASD TESTS TREATED 
NO DIFFERENTLY THAN 
ROADSIDE DEMANDS
R. v. Bilawey, 2009 SKCA 9 
The accused was returning  from a 
trip to Eastern Canada via the United 
States when he arrived at a port of 
entry in Saskatchewan. He admitted 
to the Border Services Officer (BSO) 
at the primary inspection window that he had 
alcohol in his possession and that he had been in the 
United States for less than 48 hours. He was asked to 
park his vehicle and go inside to pay duties and taxes 
on the alcohol. The BSO working  the secondary 
inspection area smelled the odour of an alcoholic 
beverage when the accused presented himself at the 
counter. The accused’s speech and movement were 
affected somewhat so the accused was requested to 
go to an interview room with the intention of making 
further inquiries about his alcohol consumption and 
request that he provide a sample of his breath for 
analysis. 
The BSO made an approved screening  device (ASD) 
demand, including  an admonition that refusal or 
failure to comply with the demand was a criminal 
offence and rendered a person liable to criminal 
charges. The accused said that he understood the 
demand and he was instructed to provide a smooth, 
steady stream of air into the device and to continue 
blowing  until he was told to stop. After five 
unsuitable attempts to provide a sample, the accused 
was arrested for refusing  to supply a sample of his 
breath and advised of his right to contact legal 
counsel. He was offered and accepted an 
opportunity to call Legal Aid counsel. After speaking 
to the lawyer he asked for another opportunity to 
provide a suitable sample but was told he had been 
given five opportunities already and that his failure to 
provide a suitable sample constituted a refusal. 
At trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court the trial 
judge found the accused did not have a right to 
contact a lawyer before blowing  into the approved 
screening  device. He held that it was implicit in the 
legislative provisions that the roadside detention of a 
person for the purpose of complying  forthwith to an 
ASD demand did not engage the right to counsel. 
This limitation was justified under s.1 of the Charter 
given the important role of the screening  device in 
society’s fight against impaired drivers. The accused 
was convicted of refusing  to provide a breath sample 
under s.254(2) of the Criminal Code. An appeal to 
the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench was 
dismissed. The appeal judge found the case law 
clearly established that ASD demands made at ports 
of entry, where the test could be administered 
without delay, would not be treated differently from 
roadside demands simply because telephones were 
readily available at border offices.
The accused then appealed to the Saskatchewan 
Court of Appeal which had to answer the question of 
whether an individual must be afforded a reasonable 
oppor tuni ty to contact legal counsel , as 
contemplated by s.10(b) of the Charter, when a 
demand is made under s. 254(2) to an individual at a 
border crossing  and a telephone is immediately at 
hand. Justice Wilkinson, delivering  the judgment of 
the Appeal Court, agreed with the Queen’s Bench 
and rejected the accused’s argument that a detainee 
should reasonably be able to extend the time for 
complying  with the demand in order to consult with 
legal counsel. Instead, the Court concluded that the 
exclusion of the right to counsel was a reasonable 
limit under s.1 of the Charter as demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society. In this case 
there was no delay in making  the demand or 
administering  the tests and since the test was to be 
administered forthwith, the proximity of a phone did 
not impact the validity of the demand. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
BY THE BOOK:
s.1 Charter “The [Charter] guarantees 
the rights and freedoms set out in it 
subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.” 
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BLOOD SAMPLE READINGS 
OTHERWISE DISCOVERABLE - 
BY BREATH SAMPLE
R. v. Farrell, 2009 NSCA 3
The accused was involved in a single 
vehicle motor vehicle accident 
around 10:00 am when her vehicle 
was overturned in a ditch. As the fire 
department removed her from the 
vehicle a police officer arrived at the scene. The 
accused’s nephew told the officer that his aunt had a 
history of drinking  and driving. She was heard 
screaming  that she was in pain as 
she was strapped to a backboard. 
A n a m b u l a n c e a t t e n d a n t 
gestured in a manner that the 
officer interpreted to mean that 
the accused had been drinking. 
The officer approached the 
accused and detected an odour 
of alcohol. He accompanied her 
in the ambulance as she was 
transported to hospital and he 
formed the opinion that there 
were sufficient grounds to 
demand that she supply a sample 
of her breath or blood. He was also of the opinion 
that she would be at the hospital for some time while 
she was being  examined and treated by medical 
staff. The officer read a demand for a blood sample 
and advised the accused of her right to counsel, 
which she decided not to exercise. The emergency 
room physician subsequently took a sample of blood 
which indicated a reading of 247 mg%.  
At trial in Nova Scotia Provincial Court the judge 
concluded that although the officer had the 
necessary grounds to demand a breath sample, he 
did not have reasonable and probable grounds to 
believe that the accused’s physical condition made it 
impracticable to obtain a sample of her breath. He 
found that the officer formed the intention to make 
the blood demand shortly after arriving  at the 
accident scene and before he had any clear 
indication of the extent of the accused’s injuries. He 
also found the officer did not ask the attending 
physician if she was able to provide a breath sample. 
The judge held the blood sample evidence had been 
obtained as a result of an unconstitutional search and 
seizure under s.8  of the Charter and excluded the 
certificate of analysis under s.24(2). She was 
acquitted of impaired driving  and driving  over 80mg
%.
The Crown’s appeal to the Nova Scotia Supreme 
Court was successful. The appeal judge determined 
that the trial judge focussed on the officer’s opinion 
at the accident scene, rather than whether or not the 
officer had a proper basis to make the demand at the 
time the demand was given at the hospital. The 
accused’s complaint of injury was to her back and 
hip, which meant she could not 
leave the hospital. When asked 
about treatment, the doctor said 
that it was going  to be a while. 
The appeal judge was satisfied 
that it was appropriate for the 
officer to give the blood demand 
- he had reasonable grounds that 
the accused could not give a 
breath test because she was stuck 
in the hospital. A new trial was 
ordered.  
The accused then appealed to the Nova Scotia Court 
of Appeal arguing  the appeal judge erred by 
substituting  his view of the evidence for that of the 
trial judge and in concluding  that the trial judge did 
not consider whether reasonable and probable 
grounds for a blood demand versus a breath demand 
existed at the time of the actual demand. The Crown 
submitted that, if the appeal judge erred, the trial 
judge erred in the s.24(2) analysis in excluding 
evidence of the analysis of the accused’s blood.
Reasonable Grounds 
Justice Roscoe, writing  the opinion for the Nova 
Scotia Court of Appeal first examined the law 
concerning  the demand for blood samples under ss. 
254(3) and (4) of the Criminal Code: 
It is well established that s. 254(3) requires 
that the police officer subjectively have an 
honest belief that the suspect has committed 
“It is well established that s. 
254(3) requires that the police 
officer subjectively have an 
honest belief that the suspect 
has committed the offence and 
objectively there must exist 
reasonable grounds for this 
belief...”
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the offence and objectively 
there must exist reasonable 
grounds for this belief. ... 
I n add i t i on t o hav ing 
reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe that an 
offence has been committed, 
prior to making a demand 
for a blood sample, the 
police officer must also have 
reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe that 
because of the person’s 
physical condition, there is 
either an incapacity to 
provide a sample of breath, 
or it would be impracticable 
to obtain a breath sample. It 
is common ground on this 
appeal that the belief of the 
police officer that the person 
i s i n c a p a b l e o r i t i s 
impractical to obtain a 
breath sample must be held 
at the time the demand for 
blood is given. [reference 
omitted, paras. 11-12]
In this case, Justice Roscoe was 
of the view that the appeal 
judge erred by substituting  his 
view of the evidence for that of 
the trial judge. The trial judge did consider the 
officer’s belief at the time of the accident, but he also 
went on to consider the situation at the hospital. He 
quoted the relevant section of the Criminal Code and 
recognized that the timing  of the police officer’s 
belief was important. The trial judge found that the 
officer did not consider giving  a breath demand at 
any time and, although the trial judge concluded that 
the officer had made up his mind at the accident 
scene, it is clear that he also considered the officer’s 
thinking  at the time he made the demand. Justice 
Roscoe held the trial judge’s findings were 
reasonable and supported by the evidence. He said: 
It is clear that the trial judge considered both 
the officer’s thinking at the time of the 
accident and again at the hospital when the 
demand for blood samples was made. The 
finding  that the officer never 
considered the possibility of [the 
accused] providing a sample of 
breath is reasonable and consistent 
with the evidence. As well, the 
evidence supports the finding that 
[the officer] did not ask the doctor 
if [the accused] could provide a 
breath sample, he only asked her if 
she was capable of providing a 
blood sample. Nor did he ask [the 
accused] if she thought she was 
capable of providing a breath 
sample. That [the officer] made up 
his mind at the scene of the 
accident to seek a blood sample as 
soon as possible after arriving at 
the hospital and did not reassess 
the situation at the hospital is also 
a reasonable inference to draw 
from the evidence. Furthermore, 
the trial judge’s finding that the 
officer’s prime consideration was 
obtaining evidence before two 
hours passed, was also reasonable. 
[para. 20]
Admissibility
Justice Roscoe reversed the trial 
judge’s ruling  in excluding  the 
evidence. Although the blood sample 
was conscriptive evidence, which will 
generally render a trial unfair, the evidence was 
discoverable by an alternative means - a breath 
sample. The officer had the legal justification to 
demand a breath sample. “It is a rational inference 
from the evidence that if [the accused] was prepared 
to consent to giving  a blood sample, that she would 
have consented to providing  a breath sample if she 
were capable of doing  so,” said Justice Roscoe. 
“Providing  a breath sample is less intrusive than 
allowing  a sample of blood to be drawn.” He 
continued:
In this case, since the [accused] agreed to 
provide a blood sample it is logical to 
assume that if she had been capable of 
providing a breath sample, she would have 
consented to that procedure. If [the officer] 
had asked the doctor if [the accused] was 
“ In addition to having 
reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe that an 
offence has been committed, 
prior to making a demand for 
a blood sample, the police 
officer must also have 
reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe that 
because of the person’s 
physical condition, there is 
either an incapacity to 
provide a sample of breath, 
or it would be impracticable 
to obtain a breath sample. ...
[T]he belief of the police 
officer that the person is 
incapable or it is impractical 
to obtain a breath sample 
must be held at the time the 
demand for blood is given.”
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capable of providing a breath sample and the 
answer was “yes”, presumably he would 
have made arrangements for a breath sample 
to be taken. If the answer was “no” she was 
not capable because of her medical 
condition, the blood sample would have 
been legally provided in accordance with the 
legislation. In either case, if it was not 
practicable to obtain a sample of breath, the 
pre-conditions for obtaining  a blood sample 
would have been met. I agree ... that the 
evidence in quest ion was probably 
discoverable in any event and therefore its 
admission would not offend against trial 
fairness. [para. 3]
The breach also fell somewhere between a serious 
one and a technical one. “Here the police officer did 
have reasonable and probable grounds for making  a 
demand for a breath sample, there was no finding  of 
bad faith on the part of police officer, and the 
accused consented to providing  the blood sample,” 
said Justice Roscoe. “The breach seems to have been 
founded in the officers mistaken belief in the time 
limit for obtaining  a sample. These factors, taken 
together, tend to weigh in favour of admissibility of 
the evidence.” The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal 
concluded the admission of the accused’s blood 
analysis would not bring  the administration of justice 
into disrepute and should have been admitted. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed and the matter was 
remitted back to provincial court for trial 
continuation with the blood analysis being 
admissible. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
ACADEMIC EXCERPT:
BY THE BOOK:
Blood Demand - Criminal Code
s.254(3) Where a peace officer believes 
on reasonable and probable grounds 
that a person is committing, or at any 
time within the preceding  three hours 
has committed, as a result of the 
consumption of alcohol, an offence 
under section 253, the peace officer may, by demand 
made to that person forthwith or as soon as 
practicable, require that person to provide then or as 
soon thereafter as is practicable 
(a) such samples of the person's breath as in the 
opinion of a qualified technician, or 
(b) where the peace officer has reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe that, by reason of any 
physical condition of the person, 
(i) the person may be incapable of providing  a 
sample of his breath, or 
(ii) it would be impracticable to obtain a sample of 
his breath, such samples of the person's blood, 
under the conditions referred to in subsection (4), 
as in the opinion of the qualified medical 
practitioner or qualified technician taking  the 
samples are necessary to enable proper analysis to 
be made in order to determine the concentration, if 
any, of alcohol in the person's blood, and to 
accompany the peace officer for the purpose of 
enabling such samples to be taken. 
s.254(4) Samples of blood may only be taken from a 
person pursuant to a demand made by a peace officer 
under subsection (3) if the samples are taken by or 
under the direction of a qualified medical practitioner 
and the qualified medical practitioner is satisfied that 
the taking  of those samples would not endanger the 
life or health of the person.
“Although the spouse beater 
may have no legi t imate 
privacy claim in relation to the 
fact he beats his spouse, he 
can nonetheless shelter himself behind his 
general right to privacy in his home.” - 
Croft Michaelson, “The Limits of Privacy: Some Reflections 
on Section 8 of the Charter” in jamie Cameron & James Stribopoulos, 
eds., The Charter and Criminal Justice : Twenty Five Years Later 
(Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2008) 87 at 102.
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SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST 
DOES NOT REQUIRE WARRANT
R. v. Nolet & Vatsis, 2009 SKCA 8
A Saskatchewan police officer 
randomly stopped a commercial 
transport tractor-trailer unit travelling 
eastbound along  the Trans-Canada 
Highway near a weigh scale at 11:17 
pm. The tractor-trailer unit had Quebec license plates 
and was being  driven by the accused Vatsis while 
Nolet (a co-driver) and Blain (along  for the ride but 
now deceased) were passengers at the time of the 
stop. The purpose of the stop was to conduct a safety 
check on the driver (sobriety and alertness) and the 
vehicle as well as inspect documents, including 
driver’s license, registration, load papers, log  books, 
and safety inspection stickers. On approach to the 
vehicle the officer noticed that the IFTA fuel tax sticker 
had expired, a provincial offence. Vatsis was asked for 
his driver’s license, log  book (which had not been 
filled out properly) and vehicle registration. When 
asked for a bill of lading  and manifest for the load, 
Nolet advised they were travelling  empty but 
provided bills of lading  for the westbound portion of 
the trip showing  deliveries which were not logged in 
the logbook. The vehicle was also not pro-rated for 
commercial driving  in Saskatchewan, an offence 
without a permit. This would have entitled the officer 
to immediately prohibit the vehicle from further travel 
within the province.
The officer then inspected the trailer by looking 
through the open doors. Concerns arose that there 
may have been some alterations to the trailer. It 
“looked odd; it didn’t appear right,” he would later 
testify. The officer inspected the contents of the tractor 
portion of the unit and any documents (to see if there 
were multiple log  books - in particular older ones) and 
to ensure that there was no cargo in the tractor area. 
The officer noticed some travel bags among  some 
clothes on the floor and he pressed on a small duffel 
bag. He heard the sound of crackling  paper and felt 
what he thought was paper in the bag. He opened the 
duffel bag  expecting  to find documents but instead 
discovered a bag  full of money (later determined to be 
$115,000). He immediately arrested all three 
occupants for possessing  proceeds of crime and gave 
them the police warning  and advised them of their 
right to counsel. Back-up was called and a closer 
inspection of the trailer confirmed that modifications 
had been done to the trailer - the interior length of the 
trailer was about a metre less than the exterior length 
suggesting  a false compartment at the front of the 
trailer. The vehicle was moved to the police 
detachment and 15 boxes and two duffel bags 
containing  392 pounds of marijuana were discovered 
after panelling  was removed to expose the hidden 
compartment. Also found in and around the cab of 
the tractor unit were various papers, receipts, and 
commercial documents, including  a complete change 
of decals and stickers, receipts and tolls, log  books for 
other drivers, and a dispatcher report. The accuseds 
were charged with trafficking  in marihuana, 
possessing  for the purposes of trafficking, and 
possessing the proceeds of crime.
At trial in the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench 
the trial judge found the initial vehicle stop and 
inspection was valid for regulatory purposes, but 
when the officer looked inside the trailer and formed 
the suspicion or “hunch” that alterations had been 
made, the focus or “predominant purpose” of his 
inquiry shifted from a regulatory inspection to a 
criminal investigation thereby engaging  Charter 
protections. The powers of regulatory inspection under 
the Motor Carrier Act and the Highways and 
Transportation Act,1997 permit examination, 
inspection, and searches of vehicles for violations 
related to commercial transport - a highly regulated 
industry. The initial detention in stopping  the vehicle 
for regulatory reasons and the initial inspection of the 
empty trailer did not breach the Charter, but the two 
warrantless searches that followed - the search of the 
duffel bag  containing  the money and the post-arrest 
search in measuring  the trailer at the roadside - were 
unreasonable because the officer did not have 
reasonable grounds. 
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As for the arrest it was unlawful. Although the 
discovery of the money in the duffel bag  heightened 
the officer’s suspicion, it did not establish reasonable 
grounds for arrest, thus violating  s.9 of the Charter. 
The trial judge ruled the unusual circumstances of 
three drivers, a vehicle not registered for commercial 
use in Saskatchewan, and an empty load, were more 
“neutral” than indicative of illegal activity. And even if 
the arrest was lawful she would have held the two 
searches of the trailer subsequent to the arrest - the 
roadside measurement and the detachment search - 
breached the accuseds privacy rights. 
The roadside search required a warrant as no exigent 
circumstances or safety concerns existed and the 
detachment search occurred two hours after the arrest 
and there were no exigent circumstances - the 
accuseds were in custody 
and the vehicle was secured 
with a padlock. Finding 
p o l i c e b r e a c h e d s . 8 
(unreasonable search and 
seizure) and s.9 (arbitrary 
detention) of the Charter, the 
$115,000 in cash packaged 
in distinctive bundles and 
392 pounds of marihuana 
were excluded as evidence 
by the trial judge. The trial 
judge was of the opinion 
that the admission of it 
w o u l d b r i n g  t h e 
administration of justice into 
disrepute and the accuseds 
were acqu i t t ed o f a l l 
charges. 
The Crown appealed to the 
Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal arguing  the trial judge erred in ruling  the 
accuseds Charter rights had been violated. Under s.8, 
the Crown submitted that the accuseds failed to 
demonstrate they had any expectation of privacy with 
respect to the duffle bag  or the commercial vehicle, 
and therefore had no standing  to bring  a s.8 Charter 
application. As well, it was contended that “dual 
purpose” searches do not violate s.8  of the Charter so 
long  as the regulatory search was itself reasonable and 
met Charter scrutiny. In other words, a lawful search 
conducted within the scope of statutory or regulatory 
powers does not become invalid simply because the 
officer formed a suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. 
And the Crown submitted, among  other things, that 
the trial judge did not consider the officer’s suspicion 
about the false compartment in her assessment of 
whether there were reasonable grounds for arrest in 
the s.9 analysis.
Privacy Expectation
Justice Wilkinson, writing  the opinion for the majority, 
first noted that a person challenging  a search must 
prove they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Th i s a 
precondition before there is an 
assessment of whether the search 
was unreasonable. She described it 
this way:
An individual who accuses the 
State of invasion of privacy bears 
the onus of proving that a 
reasonable expectation of privacy 
exists . The Crown, in the 
circumstances of a warrantless 
search, bears the onus of proving 
the search was reasonable, 
except where the search is 
incidental to a lawful arrest. 
Search incidental to arrest is an 
exception to the rule, and the 
individual therefore bears the 
burden of establishing the search 
i n c i d e n t t o a r r e s t w a s 
unreasonable. [para. 37]
In meeting  the onus, the person must do more than 
simply assert that a privacy interest exists. There is no 
automatic right to standing  and a reasonable privacy 
interest must be established in the circumstances. 
“The curtain of privacy may be as solid as a screen or 
as sheer as a veil,” said Justice Wilkinson. And simply 
“An individual who accuses the 
State of invasion of privacy bears 
the onus of proving that a 
reasonable expectation of privacy 
exists. The Crown, in the 
circumstances of a warrantless 
search, bears the onus of proving 
the search was reasonable, except 
where the search is incidental to a 
lawful arrest. Search incidental to 
arrest is an exception to the rule, 
and the individual therefore bears 
the burden of establishing the 
search incident to arrest was 
unreasonable..”
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r e s t i n g  a p r i va cy c l a i m o n 
presumptive possession and control 
of the vehicle is not necessarily 
enough. In other words, to gain 
access to the exclusionary remedy in 
s.24(2) an accused must show a 
breach of his or her personal rights. 
To succeed here the accuseds had to 
establish a sufficient privacy interest 
in the commercial vehicle or the 
duffel bag  itself. Justice Wilkinson, however, found 
they failed. Although they were present for the search 
other factors did not support a privacy interest: 
• the log  books that may have demonstrated 
historical possession or control were not 
completed;
• the vehicle did not usually operate outside 
Thunder Bay, Ontario;
• the accuseds’ status and the nature of their 
relationship to the registered owner of the 
vehicle and/or the commercial carrier, was in a 
confused state and no attempt was made to 
clarify it.
• knowledge of the transportation legislation is a 
requirement to be licensed as a driver. The 
accuseds, as licensed drivers, would be well 
aware of the possibility of mandatory inspections 
and searches, whether for documents or for 
potential violation of any one of the countless 
obligations imposed by the regulatory scheme;
• no one asserted a right or interest in the duffle 
bag. The accuseds actively disclaimed any 
interest in the article of luggage and attributed 
sole ownership to Blain (the deceased 
passenger);
As a result, the accuseds did not meet the onus of 
establishing  a privacy interest and therefore failed to 
establish a s.8 Charter infringement. 
Dual Purpose Search
The Crown’s alternative dual purpose 
argument was also successful. The 
trial judge’s analysis turned on 
whether the predominant purpose of 
the search related to a regulatory 
i n s p e c t i o n o r a c r i m i n a l 
investigation. In other words, at the 
moment the officer saw the empty 
trailer and speculated that alterations had been made, 
the search was not transformed from a regulatory 
inspection into a criminal investigation. Instead, if the 
police have statutory powers of search, as in the 
Highways and Transportation Act, the fact that the 
police have suspicions of other kinds of wrongdoing 
apart from traffic offences did not invalidate the 
search. Dual purpose searches are not a violation of s.
8  of the Charter, so long  as the statutory search meets 
Charter scrutiny. 
“Searches are only reasonable if they are authorized 
by law, if the law itself is reasonable, and if the 
manner of the search is reasonable,” noted Justice 
Wilkinson. And this was not a random check stop 
program where pol ice powers have been 
constitutionally confined to matters of sobriety, 
licenses, ownership, insurance and mechanical fitness 
of cars and in going  beyond these matters there must 
be reasonable grounds to detain according  to the 
common law investigative detention requirements: 
Transposing  principles from one context to 
another can present difficulties. The police 
powers during a random stop that constitutes 
an arbitrary detention under s. 9 of the Charter 
are not the same as police powers in a 
justifiable detention targeted to a regulatory 
scheme, nor are they the same as powers 
exercisable in the course of other police 
duties. The importance of the contextual 
approach lies in its consideration of the 
particular circumstances of these individuals, 
and this state action, adjudged in the totality 
of circumstances that have bearing on the 
case.
“Searches are only 
reasonable if they are 
authorized by law, if the 
law itself is reasonable, and 
if the manner of the search 
is reasonable.”
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Here, there was no arbitrary detention in 
relation to the regulatory stop. ... [A] lawful 
detention to investigate provincial infractions 
(a burnt-out headlight and open beer) does 
not become an unlawful detention, or prevent 
the police from asking questions about 
alcohol and mechanical fitness of the vehicle 
because the police also suspected the 
presence of drugs. ... [references omitted, 
para. 81-82]
However care must be taken in differentiating 
between powers exercisable in the course of a 
random roadside check stop, and those exercisable in 
the course of other police duties - such as when a 
driver is legally stopped for speeding. Officers do not 
need to ignore other legitimate aspects of their 
general duties and powers and when so engaged do 
not leave their perceptory senses - whether visual, 
olfactory or auditory - at some other location. 
However, in dual purpose stops, a nominally lawful 
aim should not be used as a plausible facade for an 
unlawful aim. In other words, the lawful aim cannot 
be used as a pretext, ruse, or subterfuge -  a plausible 
facade - to perpetuate the unlawful aim. “It is not a 
question of degree, or determining  which purpose is 
predominate or subordinate,” said the majority. 
“Rather, it is a question whether a lawful purpose is 
being exploited to achieve an impermissible aim.”
Here the police were exercising  their powers in a 
manner consistent with statutory purposes and 
objectives, and within the scope of the legislative 
authority. A commercial carrier engaged in long-haul 
trucking  operates in a tightly regulated environment 
and is subject to many recording  and reporting 
requirements, especially when operating  extra-
provincially or internationally. Peace officers are 
inspectors for the purpose of monitoring  compliance 
with various aspects of transportation policy, 
legislation and regulation. Their powers of search, and 
of entry and inspection have common themes:
The scenario of an unregistered vehicle 
operating  outside its usual jurisdiction with 
expired IFTA decals, attended by two, and 
possibly three, drivers carrying questionable 
documentation, certainly posed something of 
a regulatory nightmare. It would have been a 
rank abdication of duty on the officer’s part 
had he not conducted further investigation. 
Having found no less than three regulatory 
violations in a scant few minutes, the officer 
had reasonable grounds to search for, and 
seize, documents and any evidence of other 
operating  infractions. The violations were not 
trivial ones, and non-registration in 
Saskatchewan was a particularly glaring 
omission. The purpose of vehicle registration 
and the importance of strict compliance with 
the law is that registration is the first essential 
step towards the enforcement of all laws 
controlling  the operation of motor vehicles 
on the public highways. 
Weights and dimensions, and equipment that 
deviates from manufacturer’s specifications, 
are entirely legitimate concerns of the 
regulatory scheme. This is an industry where 
even modes t a l te ra t ions to fac tory 
specifications must be flagged and safety 
inspected. It is an industry where ratings and 
over-dimensions, cargo securement, and 
weight distribution relate very directly to the 
stability of a tractor-trailer unit, and hence, 
valid safety issues. Trailers are prone to jack-
knifing. Semi-trailers are generally the largest 
objects on the highway and the least 
maneuverable in terms of rapid response to 
changing  road conditions. Instability can 
easily topple a trailer unit on a curve or an 
incline. A mere hunch or speculation that a 
trailer has been altered or refabricated, even if 
hidden contraband is the suspected reason for 
the alteration, does not taint an otherwise 
lawful regulatory search.
The search for documents was authorized by 
law. The officer testified that he relied on s. 63 
of the Highways and Transportation Act, 1997 
that in his experience papers relevant to the 
commercial operation could be scattered in 
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various areas throughout the tractor unit and, 
indeed, this proved to be the case. Nothing in 
the circumstances of this case indicated the 
officer’s search for documents was a pretext 
or an exploitative misuse of the regulatory 
search powers, and the trial judge certainly 
did not find that to be the case. She did find 
that, on balance, he was “more interested” in 
drugs than documents, but did not conclude 
the regulatory concerns were being  used as a 
pretext or a facade in order to facilitate a 
search for drugs. 
The fact that the officer abandoned the 
regulatory concerns once he found the cash 
does not negate the fact of their existence. 
[reference omitted, paras. 112-115]
And further:
In summary, the search of the duffle bag fell 
within the scope of the officer’s powers 
conferred explicitly by provincial statute 
(namely The Highways and Transportation 
Act, 1997) for securing and advancing  the 
purposes and objectives of the Act in the 
context of the larger regulatory scheme. That 
power was not exploited, or used as a pretext, 
ruse or subterfuge. The Crown met the onus of 
establishing in the totality of circumstances 
that the search was: (a) authorized by law; (b) 
the law was reasonable; and (c) the manner of 
the search was reasonable. [It was not] an 
organized police initiative conceived and 
designed for the dual purpose of conducting 
sweeping  criminal investigations during 
rout ine t raf f ic s tops. The operat ion 
overstepped the bounds of what was 
constitutionally permissible and could not be 
saved by s. 1 of the Charter. The operation 
could safely be characterized as a pretext. In 
contrast, the power to “look in every nook 
and cranny of a commercial vehicle” (absent 
pretext, ruse or subterfuge) can be likened to a 
statutory power of investigative detention for 
regulatory purposes. The ambit and scope of a 
regulatory inspection of a commercial vehicle 
far exceeds the limited inquiry permitted in a 
routine traffic stop of private vehicles. The 
powers in s. 63 of the Highways and 
Transportation Act to stop, search, and seize 
necessarily include the power to detain 
individuals for investigation of regulatory 
infractions the particular justification in this 
case being the log book violations. The officer 
was entitled to detain the [accuseds] until his 
investigation of the log  books and supporting 
documents was complete. In my analysis, the 
issue of arbitrary detention does not come 
into play in the circumstances of the case 
until the point of arrest. [para. 121] 
The Arrest
Although the trial judge accepted that the officer 
subjectively believed he had reasonable grounds to 
arrest the accused for possession of proceeds of 
crime, she found that the circumstances - the empty 
load, the admittedly “rare” situation of a commercial 
vehicle operating  without appropriate registration, the 
presence of a third occupant along  for the ride - were 
more “neutral” than indicative of criminal activity and 
therefore, even in light of the $115,000 cash packaged 
in bundles, did not meet the objective test for arrest. 
However, she did not consider the other unusual 
circumstances, including  the expired IFTA decals, the 
deficient log  books, and the officer’s sense that the 
cargo hold appeared odd or altered. In Justice 
Wilkinson’s view the trial judge imposed too high a 
standard on the requirements for a lawful arrest.
In this case there was a large sum of money packaged 
in distinctive bundles, which, in the officer’s 
experience, was indicative of drug  proceeds. And the 
money was found, not in a private vehicle, but in a 
commercial vehicle attended by a number of unusual 
circumstances that were discovered very rapidly in 
the course of a regulatory inspection. The altered 
appearance of the cargo hold, while insufficient on its 
own to provide reasonable grounds, was nonetheless 
a relevant factor which, on the totality of the 
evidence, provided reasonable grounds for arrest. In 
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recognizing  the requirement that an arresting  officer’s 
grounds be assessed against a reasonableness standard 
in order to protect against arbitrary, capricious, or 
officious abuse of state powers, Justice Wilkinson 
stated:
To the extent that an “after-the-fact” judicial 
review must be able to independently and 
objectively assess the grounds upon which 
the officer relied, that standard is satisfied 
here. On preliminary inspection, the cargo 
hold looked odd or altered. Physical 
measurements could readily 
c o n f i r m t h e i n t e r i o r w a s 
significantly shorter than the 
exterior, and that the trailer’s 
factory specifications had been 
altered. The officer’s observation is 
objectively verifiable. ...
However, if an officer forms a 
belief based, in part, on deviations 
in the appearance of an article, or 
a piece of equipment that is 
something that the reasonable 
person placed in the position of 
the officer might readily accept. 
Reasonable people understand it is 
possible to walk into a place and feel it looks 
smaller inside than it appears from the 
outside. These observations can be empirically 
tested.
The trial judge took the view that if the 
measurement had been done earlier, it might 
have been relevant to the analysis. In deciding 
wha t c lu s t e r o f c i rcums tance s , o r 
“constellation of objectively discernable facts” 
is sufficient to provide reasonable grounds for 
arrest, the “reasonable person placed in the 
position of the police officer” would fairly and 
appropriately consider the circumstances in 
broad totality. With each “red flag” that this 
officer encountered, he did not have the 
luxury of stopping to take a thread count. He 
was one officer dealing  with three individuals 
on a busy highway in the middle of a winter 
night. ... [I]n determining whether the 
reasonableness standard had been met, [a 
court can take into] account ... the context 
and the dynamics at play in situations of 
arrest where decisions must be made quickly 
and on information that is often less than 
exact or complete. 
Accordingly, the of f icer ’s suspicion 
concerning the appearance of the cargo hold 
should have been taken into account along 
with his experience in the 
field and the constellation 
of unusual factors or “red 
flags” that featured in the 
circumstances of this case. 
T h e s e i n c l u d e d t h e 
discovery of a duffel bag full 
of money, a commercial 
vehicle operating  far outside 
i t s u sua l co r r i do r o f 
operat ion without the 
appropriate registration or 
IFTA decals, the driver’s 
explanation that a delivery 
had been recently made in 
yet another jurisdiction the 
vehicle was not authorized to operate in, the 
irregular documentation, and the unusual 
presence of three occupants in a vehicle 
carrying no commercial cargo. Further, the 
trial judge should have considered the officer’s 
evidence regarding the unusual bundling of 
the money. [references omitted, paras. 
131-134]
The trial judge aslo erred in not considering  the 
officer’s experience and training  in relation to seizures 
of cash and the significance of its distinctive 
packaging  when considering  whether objectively 
reasonable grounds for arrest existed because the 
officer had not been qualified as an expert. “The 
officer stated he had had past experience with 
seizures of cash, and his testimony regarding  the 
small denominations and distinct bundling  of the 
“In deciding what cluster of 
circumstances, or 
‘constellation of objectively 
discernable  facts’ is sufficient 
to provide reasonable grounds 
for arrest, the ‘reasonable 
person placed in the position 
of the police officer’ would 
fairly and appropriately 
consider the circumstances in 
broad totality.”
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cash should have been admitted and considered by 
the trial judge in relation to the question whether of 
the officer’s belief that a crime had probably been 
committed was objectively reasonable,” said Justice 
Wilkinson. “While the officer’s lack of expertise may 
have precluded him from giving  opinion evidence on 
the ultimate issue whether the money was, in fact, 
proceeds of crime, the evidence was nonetheless 
admissible for the limited purpose of explaining  and 
justifying  the officer’s decision to effect an arrest.” As a 
result, the trial judge erred in finding  the arrest for 
possessing  proceeds of crime unlawful and a breach 
of s.9 Charter. 
Searches Incident to Arrest
A search incidental to arrest, a 
common law power permitting 
police to search a lawfully arrested 
person and seize anything  in his or 
her possession or immediate 
surroundings to guarantee the 
safety of the police and the 
accused, prevent the prisoner’s 
escape or provide evidence 
against him, is an exception to the 
principle that warrantless searches 
are prima facie unreasonable. The validity of such a 
search, however, “depends on the arrest being  lawful, 
the manner of search being  reasonable, and the 
purpose of the search being  truly incidental to the 
arrest.” 
In this case the majority found both searches could be 
properly classified as searches incident to arrest. The 
first search - the roadside measurements of the interior 
and exterior of the trailer - bolstered the arresting 
officer’s concern that there was a secret compartment 
in the cargo hold. The trial judge, however, said that 
even if the arrest was lawful, this search was not a 
reasonable search incident to arrest, because: (1) there 
were no exigent circumstances; and (2) there were no 
concerns for officer safety. She failed to mention the 
valid objective of searching  for evidence. The second 
search - conducted a considerable time later at the 
detachment - was done for a valid purpose which was 
objectively reasonable. This purpose was to search for 
evidence related to the offence for which the 
accuseds had been arrested. The trial judge had 
applied an incorrect legal test in determining  the 
validity of a search incident to arrest because she gave 
no consideration to whether the officer was lawfully 
engaged in a search for evidence related to the 
offence of possessing proceeds of crime.
The cash and marihuana should not have been 
excluded and the Crown’s appeal was allowed, the 
acquittals set aside, and a new trial was ordered on 
all charges.
A Different View
Justice Jackson, in dissent, was of a 
different opinion. In her view, the 
trial judge did not err in finding 
breaches of ss.8  and 9 of the 
Charter. She also agreed the 
money found in the duffle bag 
should have been excluded, but 
not the marihuana. The acquittal 
on the possessing  proceeds of 
crime was sustained but she would 
have ordered a new trial on the 
possession and trafficking  of marihuana charges. On 
the dual purpose issue, she stated:
... [T]his notion of dual purpose appears to be 
settled in this jurisdiction. The combination of 
both a lawful and an unlawful aim produces 
an unlawful check stop. The police authority 
to stop in this case rests on s. 40(8) only. ... 
[T]he police officer, in effecting  that stop, 
cannot have, as one of his overt purposes, a 
search for criminal activity. In this case, the 
police officer discovered what he believed to 
be an infraction of The Highways and 
Transportation Act, 1997, but the principle is 
the same. A police officer who started out 
with a lawful purpose in effecting the random 
stop is not permitted to change his focus, 
without even “reasonable grounds to 
suspect,” ... that a crime has been committed, 
“The validity of [a search 
incident to lawful arrest] 
depends on the arrest being 
lawful, the manner of search 
being reasonable, and the 
purpose of the search being 
truly incidental to the arrest.”
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simply because a regulatory infraction is 
discovered. [references omitted, para. 192] 
And further:
It is not inappropriate for a police officer “to 
be aware” that any regulatory search may 
uncover contraband or to have expectations 
that a search lawfully conducted in relation to 
the regulatory search power may uncover 
drugs. Nor can a police officer turn away from 
plain view or plain smell discoveries. What a 
police officer cannot do, however, is search 
for contraband with that as the purpose or one 
of the defined purposes of the search, when 
the search authority extends to regulatory 
matters only. It will be for a trial judge to 
determine what the police officer believed, 
saw or smelled.
The trial judge’s finding of the police officer’s 
intention in this case is crucial. She found this 
police officer’s focus changed from inspection 
to a search for criminal activity. I interpret 
these words to mean that the police officer’s 
interest in regulatory matters was now playing 
a minor role, if any. The police officer was 
now searching for evidence of criminal 
activity when his only authority was to search 
in relation to regulatory matters. As defence 
counsel aptly point out, the trial judge did not 
find that the officer could not have continued 
his regulatory inspection once he had 
suspicions of criminal wrongdoing, if the 
focus had been still to investigate regulatory 
issues. For instance, she did not address what 
the situation would have been if the officer 
had continued, in spite of his suspicions, to 
inspect the vehicle in relation to regulatory 
concerns by asking to see the co-driver’s log 
book, or any other documentation of this 
nature, or even searched the cab of the truck. 
The police officer, by contrast, proceeded 
immediately from a cursory examination of 
the trailer to the sleeping area, where his 
search began with a search of the luggage. 
The trial judge correctly interpreted the law. 
She made a clear finding  as to the police 
officer’s intentions. She then reached the 
conclusion that, in the circumstances of this 
case, for the officer to proceed to search for 
drugs as the focus of his search, he needed 
either informed consent or reasonable and 
probable grounds to search. I see no basis to 
interfere with either her reasoning or her 
conclusion. [paras. 198-200]
On the search incident to arrest analysis, Justice 
Jackson would have agreed with the majority that “if 
the arrest had been lawful, the searches undertaken as 
incident to that arrest would have been lawful as 
well” and the police would not have been required to 
obtain a search warrant. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s Note: Appeal of this case to the Supreme 
Court of Canada has been granted. 
BY THE BOOK:
Fisheries Act - Seizure Authority
s.51 A fishery officer or fishery guardian 
may seize any fishing vessel, vehicle, 
fish or other thing that the officer or 
guardian believes on reasonable 
grounds was obtained by or used in 
the commission of an offence under 
this Act or will afford evidence of an offence under 
this Act, including any fish that the officer or guardian 
believes on reasonable grounds 
(a) was caught, killed, processed, 
transported, purchased, sold or 
possessed in contravention of 
this Act or the regulations; or
(b) has been intermixed with 
fish referred to in paragraph 
(a).
Volume 9 Issue 3 - May/June 2009
PAGE 37
NO PRIVACY INTEREST 
ESTABLISHED: 
s.24(2) INAPPLICABLE
R. v. King, 2009 PEICA 9
The accused was a l i cenced 
commercial lobster fisherman and 
also employed with Transport Canada 
as a Harbour Master/Wharfinger 
where he had responsibility for the 
supervision and management of the Transport 
Canada Marine Terminal, including  its warehouse. 
Access to the terminal was controlled by two gates, 
which were often left to allow public access. 
However, when a ship was being  off-loaded the gates 
would be closed for security purposes. Various signs, 
restricting  access and allowing  only authorized 
vehicles were posted.
Near the end of spring  lobster season two fisheries 
officers patrolling  the area saw the accused’s boat 
tied to the wharf with lobster traps and gear on 
board. The door to the warehouse at the Marine 
Terminal was open and the officers went inside to 
see if the accused was there. A number of fish pans 
full of rope were seen lying  on the floor as well as 
some buoys. An officer heard a “cracking” sound - 
moving  lobsters - and examined the contents of the 
lobster pans, finding  a number 
of lobsters. He measured some 
of them and found some to be 
undersized. While one of the 
officers left the property in their 
vehicle, the other waited in an 
empty office for the lobster 
owner to return. About 90 
minutes later the accused, in 
company of another person, 
returned, handled the lobsters, 
and proceeded to close the 
warehouse door. The officer 
confronted the men and told the 
accused some lobsters were 
undersized and he was violating 
the Fisheries Act. He was 
Chartered, declined to speak 
with a lawyer, and told the officers he owned the 
ropes and pans, but denied owning  the lobsters (98 
of 108 were undersized). The accused was charged 
under s.57(2) of the Atlantic Fishery Regulations and 
s.78(a) of the Fisheries Act.
 
At trial in Prince Edward Island Provincial Court the 
accused made a motion under the Charter to exclude 
any evidence related to the seizure. Although the 
trial judge found the officers had the right to enter 
the warehouse without a warrant to conduct an 
inspection, as soon as they discovered the illegal 
lobster they had embarked upon an investigation and 
were required to obtain a search warrant to validate 
their search and subsequent seizure. Because no 
warrant had been obtained, the accused’s s.8  Charter 
right was breached and the lobsters were excluded 
under s.24(2). The charges were dismissed. 
The Crown successfully appealed to the PEI Supreme 
Court. Since the officers lawfully entered the 
warehouse without a warrant to do an inspection, 
the appeal judge held anything  discovered in the 
course of that inspection and reasonably believed to 
be obtained by the commission of an offence or 
which might assist in proving  an offence could be 
seized by under s.51 of the Fisheries Act. The 
acquittal was set aside, and a new trial was ordered. 
The accused then appealed to the Prince Edward 
Island Court of Appeal.  
Justice McQuaid, writing  the 
opinion of the Prince Edward Island 
Court of Appeal, found it was 
unnecessary to determine whether 
the Fisher ies Act powers of 
inspection rendered the entry into 
the warehouse and the lobster 
seizure reasonable. Instead, he 
focussed on whether the accused 
had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in these circumstances. If 
t h e r e w a s n o r e a s o n a b l e 
expectation of privacy then there 
was no Charter “search” and 
therefore no need to resort to s.
24(2). “Fundamental to obtaining 
relief under s.24 of the Charter on 
“Fundamental to obtaining relief 
under s. 24 of the Charter on 
the basis that there has been a 
breach of an individual’s right to 
be protected from 
unreasonable search or seizure, 
is the presence of a personal 
privacy right. Absent a personal 
privacy right, an individual does 
not have any right to be 
protected from search and 
seizure.” 
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the basis that there has been a 
breach of an individual’s right to be 
protected from unreasonable search 
or seizure, is the presence of a 
personal privacy right,” he said. 
“Absent a personal privacy right, an 
individual does not have any right to 
be protected from search and 
seizure.” 
When an accused challenges the 
admissibility of evidence obtained 
from the search of a third party’s premises, they bear 
the burden of first establishing, on the totality of the 
circumstances, that they personally have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. “If there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of an 
accused in respect to the place in which the search 
took place, there is no violation of the s. 8  right,” 
said Justice McQuaid. “The totality of the 
circumstances must be considered in determining  if 
there was such a reasonable expectation, and this 
includes the consideration of a number of factors.” 
Factors to consider in the overall analysis include (i) 
presence at the time of the search; (ii) possession or 
control of the property or place searched; (iii) 
ownership of the property or place; (iv) historical use 
of the property or item; (v) the ability to regulate 
access, including  the right to admit or exclude others 
from the place; (vi) the existence of a subjective 
expectation of privacy; and (vii) the objective 
reasonableness of the expectation. Only after the 
accused establishes a reasonable expectation of 
privacy will the enquiry move to the second stage -
whether the search was reasonable. 
 
In this case, the Appeal Court found the accused did 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
Marine Terminal:
The [accused] was absent from the property 
at the time the officers arrived; however, they 
knew him to be present there at most times 
because of his position and they had 
observed his truck there earlier in the day. 
The [accused] was an employee of Transport 
Canada, the owner of the warehouse. He 
was responsible for the maintenance of the 
warehouse but did not have 
either possession or control by 
any legal interest such as a 
tenancy under a lease. He had 
possession only because of his 
position of employment and it 
was not exclusive. The property 
was accessible to the public with 
the [accused] having some 
control over which members of 
the public could enter and when 
they could enter.  On the day in 
question, he was not enforcing 
this control as he left this public property 
fully accessible to all who wished to enter. 
Historically, the property was accessed by 
the public, albeit at times under the 
supervision of the [accused] as the 
wharfinger.  I do not think the [accused] had 
any subjective expectation of privacy and this 
is borne out by the fact that he took the 
position, when questioned, that the lobsters 
were not his thereby inferring  others had 
access for purposes of leaving their lobster 
on the property. While the [accused] 
strenuously asserts his personal privacy 
interest in the warehouse, on a close 
o b j e c t i v e e x a m i n a t i o n o f a l l t h e 
circumstances, he did not have such an 
interest.
 
There is the notion of territorial privacy used 
as “ . . .  an analytical tool to evaluate the 
reasonableness of a person’s expectation of 
privacy.”  There is a range or hierarchy of 
places where our expectation of privacy has 
been found to be reasonable starting with 
our homes, the space around our homes, 
space where we might operate a commercial 
enterprise, our private cars and even a prison 
cell. 
 
The space occupied by the [accused] in the 
warehouse could not be said to be his 
commercial space because his employment 
with Transport Canada was separate and 
apart from his commercial fishing enterprise. 
He did not have control over the property as 
a fisher but as a wharfinger employed by 
Transport Canada. He was occupying  a 
public building because of this employment 
and using it for his commercial fishing 
“If there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy on 
the part of an accused in 
respect to the place in 
which the search took 
place, there is no violation 
of the s. 8 right.”
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enterprise.  He did not have any reasonable 
expectation of personal privacy in doing so. 
[references omitted, paras. 36-38]
 
And further:
 
There is a much reduced expectation of 
personal privacy when inspection powers are 
exercised upon an individual participating in 
a highly regulated endeavor like the fishery. 
In a regulated environment, the individual’s 
privacy interests must give way, more quickly 
than in c r iminal or quas i -c r iminal 
environment, to the need for broader powers 
of search and seizure. [para. 40]
 
Since the accused had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the Marine Terminal or the warehouse the 
officers did not breach s.8 of the Charter  when they 
entered and seized the lobster pursuant to the 
Fisheries Act. And since there was no Charter 
violation, an analysis under s.24(2) of the Charter 
was not required. The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed and a new trial was ordered.  
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
On May 5, 2009 41-year-old 
Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police Constable James 
Lundblad was killed in an 
automobile accident in 
Camrose, Alberta, while 
a t t e m p t i n g  t o s t o p a 
speeding  vehicle. He had 
been parked on the shoulder of the roadway when 
the speeder passed by.
A s C o n s t a b l e 
Lundblad made a 
U-turn to stop the 
veh ic le he was 
s t r u c k o n t h e 
driver's side by a 
grain truck. Both 
v e h i c l e s w e r e 
pushed into a ditch. 
Constable Lundblad 
s u f f e r e d f a t a l 
injuries.
Constable Lundblad had 
served with the RCMP for 
eight years.
Source: Officer Down Memorial 
Page available at www.odmp.org/
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FIN MEMORIALBritish Columbia 
Police and Peace Officers 
Memorial Service
Sunday
September 27, 2009
Form up  11:40 am
March off 12:00 pm
Ceremony 1:00 pm
HMCS Discovery
Brockton Oval
Stanley Park
Vancouver, 
British Columbia
More info at 
www.memorialribbon.com
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